

BETTER ASSISTANCE IN CRISIS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Case Study Reports

Submitted to:
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

October 2021

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BASIC Evaluation - Case Study Reports

This Appendix presents our summary case study reports for each country case (Jordan, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen) and the learning case study for SPACE. These reports are broadly structured against the BASIC theory of change. Findings from each of the case studies were compared and contrasted through cross case analysis as well as with data collected elsewhere as part of the baseline. Data gathered through the case studies fed into the overall baseline findings.

1.1 Jordan

1.1.1 Context

Jordan has the second highest refugee population per capita in the world.¹ In a context of pre-existing economic vulnerability and, recently, the C-19 pandemic, this has placed considerable strain on overstretched services, with competition for scarce jobs and housing resulting in tensions between refugees and host communities.²

“The social protection and humanitarian assistance landscape in Jordan is characterised by the co-existence of a relatively mature government-operated social protection system, mostly accessible only to Jordanian nationals, and a series of humanitarian agency- and NGO-delivered interventions that target refugees.”³

Röth et al. (2017)

The national social protection system

The main national social protection (SP) programme in Jordan is the National Aid Fund (NAF), a comprehensive scheme, including regular CTs, that operates as a semi-autonomous arm of the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD).⁴

Another important social protection programme is run by the Zakat Fund, which delivers cash and in-kind assistance through individual programmes, funded by donations, and organised through regional committees.⁵

Key recent developments in the national social protection system are as follows:⁶

- **2018 to 2021 – Horizontal expansion of the National Aid Fund** to approximately double the number of beneficiaries through the three-year Takmeely Support Programme (Takaful). This included extension of coverage to the working poor in the informal sector or in temporary irregular jobs, to the relatively poor, and to Gazan refugees. Originally planned to increase coverage from 92,000 households in 2018 to 177,000 in 2021, an extra 290,000 households were rapidly added to the programme in response to the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- **2019 – Operationalisation of National Unified Registry**, an electronic database and management system designed to improve the efficiency and accuracy of targeting mechanisms and drawing on data from 120 agencies. The database was critical to the NAF’s rapid response to the impacts of Covid-19.
- **2019 – Adoption of a National Social Protection Strategy** for 2019-2025, which provided for the first time an overarching framework for the country’s SP sector, structured around three pillars: social assistance, decent work and social security, and social services. A fourth chapter focusing on shock-responsive SP is currently in development.

Humanitarian social transfers

Transfer programmes provided for Syrian refugees by UN agencies and INGOs take the form of cash and vouchers, including winterisation assistance. The largest programmes in terms of coverage are interlinked: WFP food vouchers, UNHCR unrestricted cash assistance, and the UNICEF Child Cash Grant. The Government of Jordan (GoJ) requires agencies to make Jordanian citizens eligible for these programmes, with nationals accounting for 30 percent of beneficiaries in some cases.⁷ More than ten further schemes are in operation, with many providing ad hoc and one-off support.⁸ Jordan is often held up as an example of a country in which humanitarian transfers are delivered through sophisticated systems, including electronic registration, e-wallets and iris recognition software.⁹

Both the nexus and refugee integration agendas are increasingly prominent amongst agencies and donors. This includes considerable interest in, first, improving access to social security and insurance through supporting the national Social Security Corporation and its alignment with social assistance (NAF) systems. And, second, in supporting incremental steps towards greater alignment between the NAF and humanitarian system.¹⁰

1.1.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support

SP emerged as a priority for FCDO Jordan during its 2019 business planning, in the context of increasing poverty rates as the government attempted to meet IMF reform requirements around subsidies.¹¹

Initial investments aimed to support the reform of the national system. The Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund provided £0.5m through UNICEF to examine NAF targeting criteria and contribute to establishing the management information system (MIS) system mentioned above.¹²

In late 2019, the Social Development Adviser (SDA) at the time approached SPT for support on the design of a £100m five year programme focused on cash transfers (CTs) and systems strengthening. He had already developed a concept note for the programme, which received ministerial approval in early 2020, but sought support due to constraints on his own time and the need to address specific evidence gaps to build the business case for the programme. SPT directed him to BASIC TA.¹³ The programme focuses on support to the national SP system, but has a longer-term aim to support integration between humanitarian and government systems.

There was some frustration around the BASIC TA scoping process, on the part of both the SDA and consultants assigned by BASIC, which experienced some delays and during which initial calls focused, they felt, slightly too heavily on the administrative set up and not enough on substantive technical issues. Both, however, acknowledged that the speed of scoping appears to have improved since (with the advent of SPACE). The SDA also observed that navigating the scoping process might have been challenging for advisers who, unlike himself, did not already have a firm grounding in SP, and might have needed more guidance.¹⁴

In April 2020, BASIC TA support to the five year programme was put on hold, and shorter-term support sought from SPACE, as FCDO pivoted to support the government with its Covid-19 response. SPACE support focused on the design of an emergency CT programme to cater to immediate needs of vulnerable Jordanians. From autumn 2020, FCDO and BASIC TA returned to, and built on preliminary work already undertaken on, the design of the longer-term SP programme – as well as support to FCDO's leadership of an SP donor group which seeks to strengthen coordination amongst actors across the humanitarian-development nexus.

Despite interest from FCDO staff in-country, Jordan has not been selected as a focus country for BASIC Research. This is viewed as a missed opportunity by FCDO Jordan, whose planned five

year programme will include a policy and evidence sub-workstream, to address key data gaps – around vulnerability, for instance.

1.1.3 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

Five main pieces of support have been provided to FCDO Jordan by BASIC TA and SPACE, as outlined in Table 1 below.

Table 6.1: Overview of BASIC TA and SPACE support to FCDO Jordan

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
1	Dec 2019 – April 2020	BASIC TA	Terms of Reference (ToR) issued in December 2019 for the development of an overarching framework to guide FCDO's involvement in social assistance in Jordan for the next 5 years. Planned March 2021 BASIC TA mission cancelled due to travel restrictions and pivot to Covid-19 response.	Interim product: working Summary Document outlining the main technical, policy, and political economy issues related to strengthening the social protection system in Jordan.
2	April 2020 – May 2020	SPACE	Clinic discussion – centred on key issues arising from analysis by the SPACE team of documentation relating to proposed FCDO support to the Government of Jordan's Emergency Cash Transfer initiative in response to Covid-19, to be implemented through the NAF. Support to development of Business Case for FCDO Emergency Social Protection in Jordan (ESPJ) programme.	Business case inputs: appraisal case, including proposed VFM measures, theory of change and logframe narrative and structure, gender and social inclusion (GESI) analysis, as well as additional analysis.
3	Sep-20	SPACE	Assessment of the social and gendered risks and impacts of the emergency Cash Transfer project to inform updated project protocols and operational manual.	Rapid social and GESI assessment of Jordan's Emergency Cash Transfer Project.
4	Sep-20	SPACE	Return to longer-term planning. Analysis setting out the value for money (VFM) case for greater integration of the social transfer system in Jordan.	VFM note covering: potential areas of integration, benefits, political economy, recommended next steps.
5	Jan – July 2021	BASIC TA	Return to and updating of December 2019 ToRs for developing an overarching framework to guide FCDO's longer-term involvement in social assistance. Including stakeholder consultation exercise, and consideration of the ways in which a new programme could strengthen NAF and then, over time, facilitate and encourage the eventual alignment of the humanitarian cash with public sector social assistance in Jordan.	Synthesis report on stakeholder engagements and potential implications for FCDO Jordan. Two versions, one internal and one for sharing with external stakeholders. Options report for 5-year programme. Sessions with ambassador and x-embassy to sensitise on options, as well as session on key findings from stakeholder interviews with int donor community.

1.1.4 Response to support provided

What worked

BASIC support and deliverables have generally been well received by FCDO Jordan. The following key themes emerged from key informant interviews:¹⁵

- **High quality of advice:** BASIC TA and SPACE experts were variously described as “very knowledgeable”, “of excellent calibre” and “fantastic”. FCDO staff valued both written inputs and a series of “very helpful” discussions which informed negotiations with potential delivery partners. They also particularly appreciated that the service provided a source of challenge, grounded by in-depth analysis. As one adviser put it:
“They allowed us to think much more deeply and creatively around where we could and couldn’t add value. I have nothing but praise for their work.”
- **Rapid and flexible delivery:** FCDO staff described support provided by BASIC TA and SPACE as “agile and responsive” and “flexible in a complex context”. The support provided enabled FCDO to move quickly into the SP sector in the context of timebound commitments made at the London Jordan conference. FCDO staff also observed that in the most recent phase of support in particular, SPACE consultants were generous with their time, going beyond their contracted days.
“SPACE is a fantastic resource...a great platform for advisors who are under pressure.”
- **Facilitating cross-country learning:** One adviser pointed to BASIC’s ability to facilitate cross-country learning, with reference to the VFM paper (entry #4 in table 1, above) which provided a well-evidenced argument for the integration of humanitarian caseloads into national systems, drawing on good practices from around the world.
- **Positive reception by external stakeholders of the findings of stakeholder consultations,** as set out in the written report and presentation to the SP donor group co-chaired by FCDO. Donors and agencies generally agreed with the findings presented.
- **Effective gender and inclusion mainstreaming:** SPACE differs from many advisory services in that it mainstreams GESI-related considerations without the client having to request it explicitly. SPACE (via the Gender-responsive Social Protection programme) provided access to a multidisciplinary team that integrated strong GESI expertise.

Challenges and limitations

Challenges encountered during, and limitations of, the support provided by BASIC related to:¹⁶

- **Understanding of the political economy of SP in Jordan:** FCDO staff had mixed views as to whether BASIC support sufficiently integrated political economy (PE) considerations. Whilst some reported that BASIC consultants had a good understanding of both the Jordan and wider Middle Eastern context, one observed that they could have placed more emphasis on political dynamics within and between government institutions involved in delivering SP.
- **Relatedly, there were differences of opinion between the commissioner and consultants around timescales for building the humanitarian-development nexus,** and the implications for the framing of the longer-term programme. Specifically, the commissioner was concerned that placing too great an emphasis on refugee integration upfront would, firstly, be unpalatable to the Jordanian government and, secondly, affect the relevance to the business case of the evidence synthesised by the consultants (e.g. coverage of humanitarian caseloads when the Business Case needed to be supported by analysis focused on vulnerable Jordanians).
- **Lack of on-the-ground support:** BASIC TA deployed two consultants, one international and the other Jordanian but based elsewhere. One member of FCDO staff thought that not recruiting

an expert based in Amman was a missed opportunity, as it meant that he could not involve the consultant in in-person meetings with government counterparts. However, in the event, many activities had to be conducted virtually due to Covid-related restrictions, minimising the impact of this limitation.

- **Less positive reception by MoSD in particular of the findings of stakeholder consultations:** overall, MoSD felt that the findings reflected the perspectives of the international community more strongly than that of government institutions. Specifically, they argued that more emphasis should be placed on elements of SP other than cash assistance. However, with the new FCDO programme seeking to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus by working with the Social Security Corporation to improve access to social insurance, this may be primarily a communications issue. At time of interview, other government stakeholders (NAF and SSC) had not yet been sighted on the report.

1.1.5 BASIC's contribution to change

[Figure 6.1](#) overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are most relevant to BASIC's support to FCDO Jordan. Statements in boxes shaded in blue are directly relevant. This section explores BASIC's contribution to changes in Jordan, with reference to, for sections 5.1 and 5.2 on FCDO's use of BASIC support and indirect results, ToC output and outcome statements and, for section 5.3 on enablers and constraints, ToC assumptions.

FCDO Jordan's use of technical assistance provided by BASIC

Support provided by both BASIC TA and SPACE has fed directly into the design of FCDO programmes – that is, provision of high quality advice (1, in figure 1 above) translated into the design the implementation of new country programmes (4). SPACE deliverables fed directly into the development of the Business Case for the £25m ESPJ programme, including FCDO's decision to use two parallel delivery mechanisms – £20m through a World Bank (WB) Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and £5m through a USAID Joint Funding Agreement (JFA) – both of which were implemented. FCDO staff reported that without SPACE's support they would not have been able to gather the necessary evidence and prepare the business case in the short time available. BASIC TA has since provided options for a new five-year programme, for which the business case is currently in development.¹⁷

BASIC support also informed internal and external communications, supporting FCDO to position itself as a thought leader in a crowded donor environment – FCDO drew on high quality advice provided by BASIC (1) in support of efforts to build commitment amongst donors, agencies and government to using SP approaches and take steps towards integration across the humanitarian-development nexus (5). Advisers drew on evidence produced by BASIC in submissions to ministers and the ambassador, and informed negotiations with NAF and donors as Jordan developed the NSPS.¹⁸

Additionally, key informant interviews suggested some limited awareness and use of centrally-produced SPACE publications beyond the FCDO (output statement 2 on greater awareness, knowledge and learning), though the outcomes of this are unclear. For example, WFP staff reported using SPACE resources to inform their programming and that they had flagged SPACE as a useful resource to the NAF in the context of the Covid-19 response.¹⁹

Results supported by BASIC

The ESPJ programme has supported vulnerable Jordanians through the NAF's flagship cash transfer programme, Takaful. It has, along with other donors, enabled the provision of emergency financial assistance to 293,000 households impacted by the economic shocks caused by the COVID-19 crisis, including informal workers who had lost livelihoods.²⁰ That is, the new FCDO programme (4)

supported by SPACE enabled government social assistance to meet household needs more effectively (8).

Use of the two funding modalities recommended by SPACE enabled the FCDO to unlock international financing for Jordan – the new FCDO programme (4) resulted, at least temporarily, in diversified funding for social assistance. By being the first donor to contribute to, and activate, the MDTF, FCDO enabled the WB to channel other funding into it, unlocking USD 300m of concessional financing for Jordan. Blending UK financial support with a loan from the World Bank also made it more affordable for GoJ by reducing interest on the WB loan. The USAID JFA established with FCDO support has since expanded to a total of six donors. Finally, parallel funding to the JFA balanced risk, as it was able to disburse funds to GoJ more swiftly than the MDTF.²¹

Both ESPJ modalities allowed the UK to maximise leverage on other donors and the WB. Combining donor financing under a single results framework encouraged donors to coordinate advocacy messages to GoJ, including focus on areas important to FCDO, such as equity.²²


Similarly, the stakeholder consultations carried out by BASIC TA earlier this year is helping to build consensus across the international community around the importance of building the humanitarian-development nexus for SP, and options for doing so. Donors and agencies reported that the consultations have helped them to find an avenue for establishing partnerships and working towards more coordinated support to and influencing of government institutions.²³ *In this way, advice and support provided by BASIC TA (4) is being used to help build coherence and coordination across actors and initiatives (6).*

Enablers and constraints

BASIC's contributions are indirect and, alone, insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Factors which have enabled the achievement of results in Jordan point to the importance of role of in-country staff:

- **FCDO Jordan has drawn on BASIC strategically, in combination with other sources of support:** FCDO has made clear 'asks' of BASIC and simultaneously used other sources of support (from the K4D Helpdesk, as well as a member of the economist cadre), drawing these together in support of its objectives. *This supports the validity of a ToC assumption linking inputs to outputs (A): FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises.*
- **FCDO Jordan has actively used BASIC to support its influencing goals**, particularly by developing evidence and options to share with the donor SP group, which it co-chairs. *This supports the validity of an assumption linking outputs to outcomes (B): FCDO posts have the absorptive capacity to utilise BASIC outputs and link to their influencing work.*

Figure 6.1: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Jordan



There are two major constraints on BASIC's ability to bring about outcome level change in Jordan:

- **Decreasing political space for integration of refugees into national systems**, in a context of increasing vulnerability of Jordanians due to the economic impacts of the pandemic. Additionally, when compared to other contexts, the crowded donor environment in Jordan limits the level of influence donors can exert over government. *This indicates significant barriers to achieving the outcome increased political commitment (5).*
- **Decreasing levels of international humanitarian funding, since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and anticipated shortfalls in funding needs for meeting existing caseloads.** This, in turn, further exacerbates the government's reluctance to integrate humanitarian caseloads into the national system. *This challenges the validity of an assumption linking outcomes to impact: Stakeholders are willing to contribute potentially increased levels of funding to support the establishment (in this case strengthening and expansion) of SP systems.*

1.1.6 Closing reflections

FCDO Jordan have expressed interest in receiving continued support from BASIC TA; for example, in providing TA to government and carrying out reviews during implementation to inform programme adaptations and the detailed design of the outer years of the proposed five-year programme. More broadly, FCDO staff observed that there is likely to be continued demand for internal advisory support to embassies on emergency SP in future due to climate change, and related shocks/displacement.

Lines of enquiry to explore in future rounds of the case study include:

- How BASIC support is drawn upon to support delivery of FCDO Jordan's new SP programme.
- How BASIC can support better coordinated and more effective engagement with government amongst donors and agencies.
- Whether BASIC Research ultimately engages in Jordan, and the results of the evidence sub-workstream of the new FCDO Jordan SP programme.

1.2 Nigeria

1.2.1 Context

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa with a population of approximately 206 million²⁴. Nigeria is home to the largest number of multi-dimensionally poor in the world, and ranks 158 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).²⁵

Four out of ten Nigerians (82.9 million) live below the poverty line (NLSS 2019), with COVID-19 pandemic likely to push another 10 million into poverty by 2022 (UNDP)²⁶. Poverty rates vary strongly between regions with a distinct divide between North and South, as well as between urban and rural areas. In 2018-19, more than 60 per cent of the population were below the poverty line (National Bureau of Statistics 2019) while southern regions have relatively low poverty rates and 18% of the urban population live in poverty compared with 52 percent living in poverty in rural areas²⁷. Unemployment rate increased to 33% in the last quarter of 2020 and with a Gini coefficient of 35.1 Nigeria is in the top eight countries with the highest inequality in income distribution in the world. The country also has a high public debt profile and the second highest burden of stunted children in the world²⁸.

Characterisation of types of crises faced their effects and particularly vulnerable populations

Nigeria is highly vulnerable to natural hazards, conflict and economic shocks which combined with a lack of livelihood opportunities puts large portions of the population at risk of poverty.

Conflict and insurgencies continue to aggravate poverty, with the northeast severely affected. Boko Haram²⁹ has led an insurgency for over a decade with the insecurity centred in Borno state, spilling into Yobe and Adamawa states. There are 1.8 million displaced people in those states (Ground Truth Solutions 2020), with many more displaced in Niger and Chad³⁰. The deteriorating security situation has increasingly restricted access to affected populations and camp closures and forced returns in Borno State has also impacted cooperation between humanitarian actors and government. The dramatic funding shortfall is another major challenge, further reinforcing the importance of enabling more shock responsive and inclusive social protection.

Analysis of ACAPS31 Severity Index data indicates that Nigeria suffered 12 crises or shocks between 2019 and 2021 including regional crises, food insecurity, conflict and complex crises.

In addition, there were some 60 climate related crises spanning the period 2009-2019 showing the climate vulnerability of the country to flooding in particular and storms. In all, almost 6 million people are estimated to have been displaced as a result of these climate related crises providing an indication of the scale of these climate related crises. The risk of famine (IPC Phase 5) persists where populations are cut off from food and income sources and humanitarian assistance for a prolonged period.

1.2.2 Key policy / institutional landscape

The Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was created in 2019 to lead on implementation of social protection programmes at federal level. Its mandate is to develop humanitarian policies and provide effective coordination of National and International humanitarian interventions; ensure strategic disaster mitigation, preparedness, and response; and manage the formulation and implementation of fair focused social inclusion and protection programmes in Nigeria.³² The new Ministry created an explicit linkage between social protection and humanitarian responsibilities of government. and implements policies and programmes set by the Social Development Department in the Budget and National Planning Arm of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning.

The Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning led on the development of the previous National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) for Nigeria (2017) which is presently being reviewed (its development was supported by the Child Development Grant Programme – CGDP - funded by FCDO). The new policy was regarded by some interviewees as a significant step forward from the predecessor plan in terms of targeting, advancement of social registers, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. In addition to the NSPP, states have started to develop their own social protection policies with 14 of the 36 states having adopted or in the process of developing a state level social protection policy³³. The President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari’s 2021 Democracy Day speech (12 June 2021) emphasised his vision to pull 100 million Nigerians out of poverty in the next 10 years. With this in mind, the President approved in 2021 a National Poverty and Growth Plan (and an associated Poverty and Economic Growth Fund).

“There is a big boom on social protection especially social assistance despite that the only significant fund the government has put into social protection is the Abacha loot. However, there has been increasing commitment as there is acceptance to include financing in the upcoming legislature.”

KII, July 2021

Nigeria’s spend on social protection is very low compared to countries of similar economic status with 2.6% of GDP on social protection and 0.3% on safety nets covering between 1.6% and 3.3% of the population between 2011 and 2016 (WB, 2019).³⁴ Social assistance schemes make up the largest share of Social Protection programmes at state level, while at federal level the National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) is the main instrument and includes four main programmes³⁵ including the National Cash Transfer Programme (NCTP). Launched in October 2016, NCTP is a Federal-Government led project supported by the World Bank’s National Social Safety Nets Project (NASSP) and led by National Social Safety Nets Coordinating Office (NASSCO). The NASSP also includes a project to build the National Social Registry (NSR) which seeks to introduce a single registry for all social assistance interventions in the country.

Coverage of social protection and labour programmes has expanded over time with further expansion taking place as a result of the government’s COVID-19 response. Social protection has been a major part of the Federal government’s response to COVID-19 and among the commitments made were a rapid expansion of the NCTP (via fast tracking registration processes) and creation of a new Programme known as the COVID-19 Urban Cash Transfer Programme.

Two key coordination mechanisms are the Abuja-based Cash Working Group (CWG)³⁶ and the Development Partners Group (DPG). The former is focused on strategic engagement between humanitarian actors on cash transfer programming. The DPG is composed of representatives of the United Nations and its agencies, donors and INGOs. DPG’s Key Political Partners Group seeks to connect donors with the Nigerian Government to drive forward critical agendas and influence government policy, in a coordinated way. In addition, there is a Technical Working Group on Social Protection (TWG on SP) which involves a number of Nigerian Ministries, departments and agencies, as well as international donors and partners. This TWG is focused on the review of the National SP policy.

Key milestones in social protection in Nigeria are set out in Figure 1.

Figure 6.2: Timeline of key milestones in social protection Nigeria



1.2 Donor support

Data on social protection spend by donor in Nigeria shows that the UK ranks as the second highest, after the World Bank, in terms of disbursements over the period 2010-19. UK disbursements to Nigeria in 2019 (constant prices USD million) amounted to 3543.15 in total with disbursements to the humanitarian sector amounting to 352.83 and social protection 19.69. Relevant FCDO programmes include **the Child Development Grant Programme (CDGP)** which is a flagship 57m GBP UKAID³⁷ and the more humanitarian focused is **FCDO's North East Nigeria Transition to Development programme (NENTAD)** which runs from 2017 to 2022 with a budget of GBP 411.6 million³⁸. The World Bank supported **NASSP** (2016-2022) with a budget of USD 183m aims to provide access to targeted transfers for poor and vulnerable households under an expanded national social safety nets system. The World Bank supported **Nigeria Covid-19 Action Recovery and Economic Stimulus - Program for Results (Nigeria CARES)** 2021-2023 will help increase access of the poor to social transfers and basic services. The EU is one of the leading contributors of humanitarian aid in Nigeria. Since 2014, the EU has provided more than €340 million to help people in need in Nigeria (with €52 m funding for 2021).

1.2.3 Origins and scope of BASIC support

IDS leads the consortium delivering the Research workstream of BASIC and is presently defining plans for Nigeria which has been classified as a deep engagement country. To date, there have been nine technical assistance assignments supported by BASIC relating to Nigeria – one supported by BASIC TAS in 2019 and seven assignments supported by SPACE 1 and 2 in 2020 and 2021. Terms of Reference were available for two of these assignments – the Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers and the Nexus Advisor role. For the other requests (for SPACE) there were scoping calls to define the assignment's objectives and approach. As notes from these calls were unavailable to the Evaluation Team, details on the background to these requests was limited and was also compromised by FCDO staff turnover.

Requests for BASIC support came through DFID and later FCDO staff, the assignments were designed to support the needs of two groups in particular – namely the CWG and DPG and were commissioned on their behalf and expressed need. The Risk Analysis work for the CWG was requested by UNOCHA and the “How SP fits into the National Development Plan” was through DPG.

1.2.4 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

An overview of the assignments supported by BASIC TAS is presented in Table 1 below.

Table 6.2: Overview of BASIC/SPACE's assignments relating to Nigeria

Date	Workstream	Beneficiary of support	Name of Assignment	Description
Oct 2019	TAS	Cash Working Group (CWG)	Linking Social Protection Systems and Humanitarian Cash Transfers in Nigeria	Mapping of ongoing humanitarian cash transfers and social protection programmes in the BAY States as a first step towards identifying potential linkages.
Dec 2020	SPACE	Development Partners Group (DPG)	Linking to the Cash Working Group.	Excel spreadsheet setting out COVID-19 responses of partners - mapping SP programme adaptations and responses to COVID-19 by Nigerian Government and donors, NGOs etc.
May 2020	SPACE	DPG	Strategy Decision Matrix and Evaluation Matrix	This work focused on options/strategies to COVID-19 response via adapting existing social protection programmes or leveraging social protection delivery systems /capacity.
Sept 2020	SPACE	DPG	How social protection fits into the national development plan	Support to the DPG to set out policy response areas which should be taken forward in a High-Level Forum for Development Partners with the Vice President of Nigeria.
Not dated	SPACE	FCDO	Support to CDGP	A consultant was commissioned to review the FCDO Children Development Grant Programme in order to explore the feasibility of a possible extension.
Dec 2020	SPACE	CWG	Risk analysis - Cash Working Group	Identification of risks associated with the impact of COVID-19 on members' cash and voucher assistance operations in the northeast (BAY States) in order to inform mitigation measures.
Jan 2021 – to date	SPACE	FCDO, CWG and DPG	Nexus Advisor	The main aim of this role was to drive coherence between humanitarian cash, social protection cash programmes and systems at operational and policy levels focusing on strengthening coordination mechanisms, relationship building and technical inputs. The role evolved with delivery, to focus more on humanitarian actors to promote more cohesive use of cash modalities in particular a modality shift from vouchers to cash (Cash Common Donors Approach).
April 2021 - draft	SPACE	SPACE led request	Case Study: Nigeria	This case study documents experiences from the government of Nigeria and partners' social protection and humanitarian responses to COVID-19. It aims to contribute knowledge and learning to inform both the direction of social protection in Nigeria, as well as global debates on shock responsive social protection (SRSP) and linking humanitarian action and social protection (HA-SP).
May 2021 - draft	SPACE	WFP and CWG	Proxy Means Testing	This assignment is presently underway to inform targeting for humanitarian cash assistance for non-camp based Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities, using an approach to prioritization that is methodologically aligned with the government. It aims to help enable the humanitarian community to inform and support the extension of the government system into areas where coverage is currently limited.

The nine TAS assignments (eight supported by SPACE, and one by BASIC) included one embedded advisor role, with the remainder short-term consultancies. Stakeholders reported it was good to have a range of different types of modalities for support – not useful to take a “*one size fits all approach*”. While an embedded role can be more internal (FCDO) facing, the short-term assignments delivered by consultants can be more external oriented allowing more critical views to be expressed.

Stakeholders interviewed indicated that the various assignments supported by BASIC/SPACE were connected and were strategically pointing in the same direction – namely supporting transition along the humanitarian-development nexus. The linkages study was viewed as foundational, paving the way for further assignments which built on this initial output. SPACE assignments were also incremental – building on each other, while the nexus role supports ongoing engagement.

Across the assignments, there are a number of common threads to activities. Most notably the need to support the linking of social protection and humanitarian actors, at national and at state levels in order to bridge the gap between humanitarian cash transfers and social protection systems and transform the way humanitarian and social protection actors operate to improve humanitarian response and to initiate, or strengthen social protection programmes to make them more shock responsive. Another key theme of the Nigeria supported assignments has been analyses of the situation with existing humanitarian and SP programmes to better inform programming, including COVID-19 response.

“In Nigeria, there is not good visibility of what is going on – it is hard to get an overview. While some of the pieces of research supported by BASIC were not joined up from the start, they are all pieces of the jigsaw and add value”

KII, July 2021

Several of the assignments (notably the linkages study and the embedded advisory role) placed an emphasis on North East Nigeria reflecting the need to support greater alignment between humanitarian cash programming and social protection programmes and systems. While the work of BASIC on the social protection system had a national focus, the humanitarian portfolio focuses on the BAY states. Interviewees reported that there was an explicit focus in all SPACE assignments on gender and inclusion (G&I) considerations and that there was a pool of G&I experts which consultants could access for support.

Interviewed stakeholders were unanimous in their view that there was a strong positive momentum behind social protection in Nigeria at this time. This is reflected in the new policy and plans on SP as well the engagement of the Nigerian government on this agenda. The new Ministry (FMHADMSD) has a strong mandate to tackle humanitarian, disaster, and insecurity issues, although it does not yet have a strategic plan setting out the Ministry’s aspirations.

The support to Nigeria also contributes to global learning. The April 2021 (draft) case study on Using Social Protection to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria aims to contribute knowledge and learning to inform both the direction of social protection in Nigeria, as well as global debates on shock responsive social protection (SRSP) and linking humanitarian action and SP.

As noted earlier the planning of the scope and activities of the Research workstream in Nigeria was underway at the time of preparation of this Case Study. As such there is not yet clarity on activities that will be delivered in Nigeria as a deep engagement country. The planning phase was somewhat disrupted due to uncertainty re the budget allocated to the Research workstream which led the consortium, on FCDO advice, to temporarily pause their engagement with Nigeria.

In terms of delivery of activities, the following worked well: remote working (reducing international travel costs), FCDO support to consultants (e.g., stakeholder introductions), longer

engagements which facilitated the building of trust with stakeholders and partners in-country, as well as SPACE's strong visibility were all noted by interviewees. Factors which worked less well included the following: time constraints for the conduct of assignments, low awareness of BASIC as a programme and remote working which compromised capacity building objectives were noted. Funding uncertainty during the Spending Review (Summer 2020) was seen as hampering planning and engagement activities. BASIC's objectives in terms of capacity building aspirations were also rated as somewhat unclear. More time should be allowed to progress the PMT work as the allocated 10 days was insufficient.

1.2.5 Response to support provided

Use of BASIC's outputs

Awareness of BASIC as a brand was low although when probed the majority of interviewees had heard of SPACE, or indeed the assignments or the consultants who conducted them. Some of the deliverables (such as the Nigeria Case Study on response to COVID-19 and the PMT work) were in draft form at the time of preparation of this case study so information on their use and response to support provided was not available. Stakeholders viewed BASIC outputs to be of very high quality.

Stakeholder feedback indicated that the most impactful work generated by BASIC/SPACE were the result of the following TAS assignments:

How SP fits in the National Development Plan assignment succeeded in engaging with key influencers and decision makers at the top of the Nigerian Government (e.g., Vice President) through providing support to the DPG in shaping government SP priorities going forward. Four policy actions were defined in the assignment's output, with stakeholder feedback indicating that three of the policy proposals are being taken forward by Nigerian Government stakeholders:

- Policy Action 2 - Design and put in place a social protection fund (some measures being taken forward drawn from this policy action)
- Policy Action 3 – Develop and put in place the necessary tools and processes to plan, track and report on social protection expenditures, across programmes and MBAs (part of new National SP Policy).
- Policy Action 4 - Amend the SP legislative framework accordingly (legal drafters have been recruited and amendments are underway).

The Nexus Advisor role was rated by interviewees as very valuable for coordination of humanitarian actors, shift of humanitarian actors towards cash, bridging the gap between theory and practice, informing FCDO policy on the nexus and in taking a longer-term perspective. The Nexus Advisor also developed an action plan on the Cash Common Donor Approach which is with donors for review at present; if agreed it should serve as a valuable tool to take forward the transition to cash and a more cohesive humanitarian approach to using cash. This work was rated by a member of the DPG as a key activity in spelling out linkages between humanitarian and SP actors. The Nexus Advisor role has helped a lot in relation to the CWG struggles with multipurpose cash and in making the linkages between humanitarian action and SP.

“She (the Nexus Advisor) is a key driver on how the nexus can be done in a practical way.”

KII, July 2021

The Nexus Advisor was able to influence DPG work on the development of the government's multidimensional poverty index (survey tool and methodology, pre-nationwide launch) by influencing

the national bureau of statistics (in partnership with UNDP) to include movement status and people in displacement (as well as several questions around food insecurity etc.). This was a critical win helping make the government's evidence base (and the wealth of policy it will inform) more inclusive of shock/crisis-affected people.

COVID-19 focused SPACE assignments – Interviewees noted that the mapping work conducted in the context of COVID-19 responses was catalytic in informing planning of DPG members responses to the pandemic. SPACE provided a platform for donors and government agencies to identify the shape of their response to the pandemic in relation to the social protection space. One of the SPACE assignments was viewed as useful in framing of the new phase of FCDO's CGDP in terms of its priorities and themes going forward.

Other BASIC/SPACE assignments were also rated as useful by those interviewed. The Mapping Linkages (October 2019) study which had the greatest awareness among interviewees was viewed as very useful for induction of new staff into roles in the FCDO Nigeria team and also for preparatory review by consultants engaged in later SPACE assignments¹. The mapping study was designed to identify ways to coordinate the implementation of cash programming including linkages with social protection emergencies and it was clear from consultations with key government stakeholders that it was used as such, with some of its recommendations on the harmonisation of cash and vouchers and the targeting of social registers underway. One government stakeholder also noted that there has been a clear follow up use of the report with meetings in North East Nigeria with the EU on the harmonisation of registers and greater interest in targeting by the Donor Group. The Nexus Advisor also used the linkages study, in particular its coverage on targeting, and is taking forward with other actors (NVCA) the use of multipurpose cash assistance modality.

The Risk Analysis work and the work on Proxy Means Testing were rated as potentially very useful. The PMT assignment has huge potential given the work underway on a new business case and the need to define approaches to create a more multi-purpose cash and social protection system and better consider targeting issues. FCDO's NENTAD programme is coming to an end and a new business case is being prepared for the follow-on programme. The risk analysis work in relation to COVID-19 response is being taken forward by Nigerian Government stakeholders. One stakeholder reported that they used the risk analysis work to negotiate with the Government and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on the movement of cash to BAY States in order to prevent insurgents from getting hold of the cash and ensure humanitarian actors comply with financial inclusion laws of the country. It also helped in engagement with Borno State during COVID-19, to lobby the Government to relax lockdown rules so humanitarian actors could provide cash and voucher assistance especially for interventions critical to lifesaving, such as food and medical assistance.

Enablers and constraints

Key factors enabling or constraining use of outputs are set out below.

¹ Although it is worth noting that there have been changes to system since this report was prepared, for example the closure of the WB-financed Nigeria Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSO) programme means there is very limited (if any) social assistance for people currently in displacement.

Table 6.3: Factors supporting or hindering use of BASIC/SPACE's outputs


Supporting use	Hindering use
Valuable when support includes help at FCDO Post on translating the findings into practical action, Presentations of findings to stakeholders also promotes use.	Knowledge sharing not structured within FCDO – some studies can fall between the cracks. Some of the contextual shifts and social protection system changes have reduced the relevance of findings for humanitarian actors.
Engaging the right partners – CWG and DPG - seen as good mechanisms to support to ensure use of outputs.	Staff transfer and lack of systematic follow up by those commissioning the research can limit use of outputs.
High quality evidence and research addressing gaps in the available pool of evidence supports use.	Greater engagement with Nigerian Government and local partners would promote more uptake of recommendations etc.
Strong convening power of the programme to engage multiple stakeholders and actors	Improved coordination of assignments is needed including contractors supported in navigating complex FCDO structures, interpretation of their ToR, creating step by step road maps on the support (line of sight).
Sequencing of assignments – incremental approach allowed a building blocks approach promoting ongoing momentum behind use of outputs.	TA support if accompanied by a funding stream can be more impactful.

1.2.6 BASIC's Contribution to Changes (or expected changes) in outcomes

BASIC's support to Nigeria is aligned to its Theory of Change (see Figure 2 below), with the proviso that the Research workstream of the programme has not yet started implementation. However, at baseline, there are challenges to measuring the contribution of BASIC to change.

While it is likely that BASIC's outputs, will, with time, contribute to outcomes (in particular the outcomes on improved coordination and improved policies, programmes and plans) supporting the adoption of social protection approaches in crises in Nigeria, it is challenging at this point to measure the extent of BASIC/SPACE's contribution to change for the following reasons. Some outputs were preliminary pieces of analysis used to inform programming (for example, COVID-19 responses of Nigerian Government and Development Partners) which are still evolving and not yet fully defined. Some outputs (Case Study and Proxy Means Testing) are still in draft stage and not yet finalised. Staff turnover in FCDO and lack of systemic follow up on the outputs from the various assignments has meant that it was not always possible to form a clear view on take-up. Some of the ambitions – better coordination or coherence amongst humanitarian and SP actors – were rated by interviewees as longer-term goals that require more time to be achieved.

Figure 6.3: BASIC's Theory of Change and Relevance to Assignments in Nigeria



The key pathways mentioned by interviewees in relation to the technical assistance support related principally to the following outcomes (colour coded in blue in Figure 6.3):

- Greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives
- New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented;
- Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice;

Coherence, coordination, and synergies

Coordination was identified by almost all stakeholders interviewed as a key problem and some indicated that the Nigerian Government should play a bigger role in this area. The linkages study (2019) on ongoing humanitarian cash transfer and social protection programmes in the BAY States was seen as a useful coordination activity, as was the mapping of programmes responses by the Nigerian Government and Development Partners to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Nexus Advisor' work should, given time, lead to positive progress with coordination of humanitarian actors on use of cash modalities and the nexus, contributing to greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors.

However, interviewees also noted that there is a crowded landscape of humanitarian and social protection actors in Nigeria and therefore hard to discern the precise contribution of one programme providing technical assistance, to change, also noting that coordination requires behaviour changes by some actors (e.g., humanitarian actors) who are used to working in a specific way². Nonetheless, BASIC's support to drive improved coordination was rated as useful and beneficial, particularly by improving coordination of humanitarian actors on the Cash Common Donor Approach as a first step.

New or improved country plans, policies, programmes and systems & evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice

There is some evidence that SPACE support was catalytic in shaping donor responses and a platform for Nigerian stakeholders to also consider and shape their responses to the pandemic thereby feeding into the outcomes on new or improved country plans, policies, programmes or systems and evidence used by governments, etc. to inform policies and practice. As noted above, advice to the Vice-President through the DPG is shaping SP policy and action by the Nigerian Government. Contribution of BASIC to FCDO business cases and programmes (e.g. CDGP) supports use of evidence to inform policy and practice.

Other outcomes – Increased political commitment and capability development

BASIC's contribution to these outcomes was assessed as less significant. The outcome relating to increased political commitment to and use of social protection approaches in crises was seen as less relevant due to the positive political economy around social protection at this time in Nigeria. The outcome on "improved human and institutional capability and capacity" was seen as important although there was a lack of clarity on how the assignments could build capacity particularly when delivered remotely and there was a need for this dimension be made more explicit in the delivery of the assignments. One interviewee noted the need for an action plan on capacity building which set out BASIC's objectives in this area and types of capacity development it supports. However other interviewees noted that there was a significant capacity building element to BASIC's work in Nigeria – in particular through the support provided by the Nexus Advisor - which was helping develop internal

² Moreover, development actors and the government need to try to understand/tackle some of the perceived/real risks to humanitarian principles, and humanitarian imperatives, that prevent engagement.

FCDO capacity, as well as capacity of Nigerian and other partners (e.g., humanitarian actors on cash approaches).

“To build capacity, you need to understand the capacity gaps and short-term pieces can help with this initial stage e.g., scoping pieces”.

KII, July 2021

Likely sustainability

Sustainability of the support provided is rated as likely at this point in terms of the contribution to improved policies, plans, systems designed and implemented given the favourable environment towards social protection in the aftermath of COVID-19. The sustainability of the efforts designed to improve coordination between actors and initiatives is at this point hard to determine although initiatives such as the setting up of the National Cash Voucher Assistance Policy Task Team represents a positive step towards improved coordination on the use of cash and voucher modalities. The sustainability of capacity building to FCDO internal teams may be eroded by staff turnover although the wider dissemination of some of SPACE’s outputs does bode well in terms of strengthening capacity among donors and stakeholders in the sector. No negative or unintended consequences from BASIC’s work in Nigeria were identified by interviewees.

1.2.7 Conclusions and issues for further consideration

Conclusions

BASIC support has been very important to Nigeria and it is clear that it has been useful to both the Abuja-based CWG and DPG in particular addressing needs for technical support, tools and analysis requested by these groups. While nine assignments focused on Nigeria, BASIC’s visibility is rather low although SPACE is better known and has had broader dissemination of its outputs.

BASIC/SPACE support is clearly making a contribution most notably to two outcomes of BASIC – around strengthening of national plans, policies and programmes and improved coordination. However, BASIC’s contribution is alongside a range of other actors (e.g. World Bank, EU and others) and on their own, small scale assignments, are not sufficient to generate substantial change, although remain valuable nonetheless in filling capacity and research gaps. There is an ongoing need to promote greater cohesion within the humanitarian sector on use of cash modalities and capacity development of Nigerian Government stakeholders.

Several factors enable or constrain BASIC’s contribution to outcome or impact level change. Factors supporting BASIC’s aspirations include engagement with the right structures to drive change (CWG, DPG), building stakeholders trust via ongoing support and its strong convening power and identification of gaps in evidence and where capacity needs to be built. Factors hindering take up of support provided include insufficient engagement with Nigerian stakeholders, insufficient structured follow up on use of outputs, with challenges to dissemination within FCDO following DFID and FCO merger and non-systematic knowledge sharing within FCDO structures.

Stakeholders were clear providing TA without a parallel funding stream does make exerting influence harder. However, TA can work if programmes like BASIC commit to building trust and engage other actors and leverage other departments in FCDO and other donors.

1.3 Somalia

1.3.1 Context

Somalia faces a multitude of different crises, including recurrent climate shocks, such as seasonal flooding, severe droughts³, and locust infestations⁴ as well as protracted conflict in southern and central regions of the country⁵. This complex context has contributed to chronic food insecurity, with a major famine taking place in 2011 and another narrowly averted in 2017 and forced displacement. These issues are exacerbated by lack of basic infrastructure and inadequate investments and limited access to basic services, including health and education, creating a situation of extreme vulnerability. Rural households and displaced communities living in settlements in urban and semi-urban areas are most vulnerable.

Social Protection in Somalia

While informal social assistance built around remittances from diaspora have existed in Somalia for some time, formal support has historically come through short-term humanitarian crisis response.⁶ Recognising the unsustainable nature of the humanitarian model in a context of recurrent crises, donors and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), have, over the past four to five years, explored long-term development led social protection approaches to responding to crises⁷.

It is within this context that in 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) developed a landmark Social Protection Policy (SSPP) through The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). The policy envisions strengthening all workstreams of a social protection system and working towards transitional safety nets before moving to comprehensive social protection programmes. The FGS intends to work with different actors, including development partners, CSOs, and encourages private-public partnerships to develop products that increase the participation of the informal sector and transfer risk from the poorest households.⁸

MoLSA assumes the responsibility to lead the implementation of the policy framework, setting standards for implementation of programmes and designing the interventions with donors and partners with other line Ministries and Federal Member States. The FGS recognises in the SP Implementation Framework that the decentralized actions are essential in the provision of social protection actions.⁹ The main challenge in pursuing this policy is the capacity and resource gap within local and national government institutions.¹⁰

There are two large social protection programmes currently running in Somalia. These are:

- The BAXNAANO National Safety Net Programme managed by MoLSA and funded through the IDA of the World Bank. Launched in 2019, the programme targets 1.2 million chronically poor people in rural areas across 21 districts with monthly cash provisions.¹¹
- SAGAL, which was launched in early 2021 and is funded by the EU, supports over 44,000 households respond to climate and conflict related shocks and disasters.¹²

The implementation of the programs is supported by both development and humanitarian partners, including UNICEF, World Food Programme, and the Somalia Cash Consortium. Funds are mainly channelled through agencies due to government systems not yet being in place. However,

³ Since 2015 there have been 25 severe weather related crises, including 16 floods, 5 cyclones, 3 droughts and one wildfire. (Climate crisis index, Global Internal Displacement Database. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>.)

⁴ ICRC, 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-new-swarms-desert-locusts-pose-threat-farmlands>

⁵ Human Rights Watch, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia>

⁶ According to UNOCHA's Humanitarian Actors data, since 2012, over 111 international organisations have been involved in providing humanitarian support to Somalia, spending a combined total of 3.64 billion USD.

⁷ Capacity4Dev, EU, 2017. <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/articles/ground-long-road-social-protection-somalia>

⁸ FGS, 2019. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-social-protection-policy-march-2019>

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ KII Group 3: other in-country stakeholders, Aug 2021.

¹¹ FGS, 2021. <https://baxnaano.so/about-baxnaano/>

¹² European Commission, 2021. <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/9576/>

a key element of the BAXNAANO is the provision a project management Unit within MoLSA to build capacity and enable operational independence within the government in the future³⁹.

While both BAXNAANO and SAGAL grew out of a system built around humanitarian cash assistance architecture, they illustrate the emerging shift of policy and programming towards social protection. Other smaller scale social protection programmes, include:

- BRCiS, a safety net programme funded by ECHO and FCDO and launched in 2013. It is led by NRC and a consortium of five other partners⁴⁰
- WFP’s Urban Safety Net programme, launched in 2018⁴¹
- EU funded Somali Cash Consortium 6.5m euro mobile cash transfer programme launched in July 2021⁴²

Coordination mechanisms

There are several SP and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, some more established than others, operating in Somalia.

Table 6.4: SP and humanitarian coordination mechanisms in Somalia

Name	Description	Sector
Donor Working Group (DWG)	The EU established a Donor Working Group (DWG) in 2017–18 to initiate the process of bringing the donor community together to initiate policy discussions on a longer-term safety net approach. The DWG was instrumental in the design and development of BAXNAANO and SAGAL.	Social Protection
Social Protection Group	There is a newly established Social Protection Group led by MoLSA and co-chaired by the World Bank	Social Protection
The Somalia Cash Consortium	Brings together key international organisations implementing cash transfers across Somalia	Nexus
Cash Working Group	Supports humanitarian cash transfers and is co-led by the WFP and Concern Worldwide.	Nexus
OCHA led cluster system	Multi-donor country-based pooled mechanism created in 2010 to allocate funding for the most urgent life-saving interventions in Somalia.	Humanitarian

Evidence Gaps

A number of important challenges and evidence gaps were identified through the data collection process. These included:

- There are no common agreed protocols on when to activate the shock responsive safety net and there is lack of granular and timely data to inform vertical or horizontal expansion of responses.⁴³
- Lack of clarity of the targeting methods adopted by the ongoing BAXNAANO and SAGAL safety net projects. Continued risk of inclusion and exclusion errors from the government led SP programs. It is also not clear how the safety net programs ensure most vulnerable populations are effectively targeted and reached.⁴⁴
 - Lack of interoperability of systems used by humanitarian cash transfer programs and the systems used by SP programs is a common concern.⁴⁵

1.3.2 Origins of BASIC support

BASIC contacted FCDO Somalia in April 2020. Initial outreach was made by the BASIC team informing FCDO Somalia of the support available through SPACE facility. Contact was also made to FGS and other local partners, including civil society organisations, on the possibility working together to explore social protection responses to Covid-19. However, this wider outreach did not generate follow up engagements⁴⁶.

FCDO request for TA was made because of an identified need for dedicated support on the emerging shock responsive SP agenda in Somalia. The support focused on mapping of cash programs and reviewing donor cash approaches to help better articulate FCDO’s current interventions and develop FCDO’s coordination strategy. The suggestion originally came from colleagues in the Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) who had identified that, externally, this was seen as something the UK was leading on globally.⁴⁷

The scope of SPACE’s engagements was discussed and defined informally through conversation between SPACE consultants and FCDO. For example, the idea of the localisation⁴⁸ framework was born out of conversation between SPACE and FCDO who identified crossover between SPACE’s existing work around localisation and opportunities through the BRCiS programme and its localisation agenda⁴⁹. Likewise, the idea of the Light Touch Review emerged out of conversations with FCDO, USAID and ECHO. These conversations identified a need for comprehensive review of Cash responses in Somalia and sustained engagement with donor. However, a lack of time on SPACE side (the consultant only had 6 days) meant that the scope needed to be reduced⁵⁰.

Overall, the process of requesting support was good, suiting FCDO’s way of working and offering enough flexibility to respond to changing needs and provide some input around scope of work. That said, the main challenge was that SPACE was geared towards providing support in ways to use Social Protection to respond to the impact of Covid-19 which was not applicable to the Somalia context.⁵¹

1.3.3 BASIC support provided and activities undertaken

Between May 2020 and June 2021, Somalia engaged with SPACE five times to produce various outputs as shown in Table 6.5:

Table 6.5: Overview of Somalia SPACE outputs

#	Modality	Engagement summary	Deliverables	Completion date
1	Short-term	<p>Providing core questions and areas of focus for the existing technical assistance facility and providing additional review of documents. This engagement provided FCDO with two matrices to support integration of COVID-19 in country programming.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Strategy Decision Matrix helped structure an independent and unbiased analysis of COVID-19 response options. The Delivery Systems Matrix helped SP teams think through potential COVID-19 response options/strategies via existing social protection programmes, or through leveraging social protection delivery systems and capacity. 	<p>Decision Matrix Somalia;</p> <p>Delivery Matrix Somalia</p>	May 20
2	Short-term	<p>Assessing Four Donor Cash Countries against donor cash principles. This engagement included scoping conversations around donor cash principles with other donor agencies and ultimately focussed around delivering the Light Touch Review. The Light-Touch Review sought to determine the impact of COVID-19 on specific elements of humanitarian cash and social protection programming. It focused on three principles: i) Accountability to Affected Populations/ Localisation; ii) Coordination and iii) Alignment of Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection programmes.’</p>	<p>Somalia Selective Light Touch Review – Donor Cash Principles</p>	March 21
3	Short-term	<p>Economic Inclusion Programming. This engagement focussed on delivering the Economic Inclusion Programming document. The note considers lessons learned from economic inclusion programming globally, outlines several key considerations for implementing such an approach in Somalia and discusses GESI considerations.</p>	<p>Economic Inclusion in Somalia</p>	Nov 20

#	Modality	Engagement summary	Deliverables	Completion date
4	Short-term	Applying Donor Cash Principles, Cash Localisation and BRCiS. This engagement was aligned to recommendations coming out of the BRCiS programme. It delivered analysis for the Somalia BRCiS programme to support a greater shift in power, funding and process to support localisation	Somalia BRCiS – Framework for a Localisation Shift	May 21
5	Short-term	SPACE Somalia Case Study. This engagement focussed on the delivery of the SPACE Somalia Case Study. The purpose of the case study was to document the scaling up of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. While overall there was a limited response to the pandemic itself, the main scale ups over this period focussed on additional needs caused by floods and locust infestation, of arguable greater importance, especially in rural areas.	SPACE Somalia Case Study 04 06 2021	In process

Source: SPACE programme documents and deliverables

1.3.4 Response to support provided

What worked

SPACE support and deliverables were overall well received by FCDO Somalia. Below is a summary of the key findings which emerged out of the key informant interviews (KIIs).

- **Outputs were targeted, responsive and useful**, responding to FCDO needs and in line with SP priorities in Somalia. Delivery from SPACE was timely and met FCDO expectations and the SPACE team was easy to work with and overall, the fluid way of working suited the FCDO.⁵²
- **Some other stakeholders are also benefiting from outputs.** Even if engagement from stakeholders with SPACE outputs was limited, some positive feedback was collected, specifically around outputs providing Covid-19 context in Somalia. It was useful for partners/agencies to understand the potential impact of COVID-19 on programming.
- **Consultations during data collection processes generated important conversations around localisation.** Consultations gave SP sector workers an opportunity to discuss localisation openly in a safe space, which brought out some important findings. For instance, that some of the push back around localisation comes down to sector workers wanting to protect their jobs.⁵³

Challenges and limitations

- **SPACE's lack of contextual understanding:** Data collected through KIIs indicated that some of SPACE's support was lacking contextual understanding. For example, the localisation framework was not effectively rooted in Somali operational reality as understood by the implementing partner, that is, challenges around capabilities of local actors. As explained through the Actor, Narrative, Interest framework, BASIC's ability to influence country policy depends on its capacity to develop context relevant social assistance policy narratives that are supported by enough actors and align with or sufficiently challenge prevailing political interests at multiple levels. While the work on localisation delivered through SPACE was aligned with certain political interests (FCDO, local stakeholders) it did not adequately account for interests or support of other partners involved in the delivery of the BRCiS programme.
- On a more general level, SPACE's Covid-19 lens was not appropriate for the Somalia context⁵⁴. As mentioned by multiple respondents and reflected in SPACE's pivot away from using a Covid only lens, Covid is largely a secondary issue to other crises and where SP system is only emerging.⁵⁵
- **Length of engagements:** Other stakeholders reported the need for more sustained engagement to deliver more comprehensive and useful outputs, especially in the complicated


context of nascent social protection system in Somalia. Limited days allocated to SPACE consultants meant limited availability, which resulted in stakeholder disengagement. For example, there was an expectation that support provided by SPACE on cash programmes would be more sustained. When it was understood that only a few days of technical assistance could be provided some stakeholders felt that this could not respond to the needs discussed. On the other hand, one respondent reported having the sense that they were being tasked because a resource (albeit limited) was available, rather than because they were addressing a specific need.⁵⁶

- **Limited reach:** While majority of interviewees had heard of SPACE/TA facility, majority had not engaged with outputs. In addition, there has been little to no engagement with Federal government of Somalia.⁵⁷ Given coordination efforts/needs, this felt like a limitation. Moreover, FGS counterparts highlighted history of excluding FGS in design of programmes and decision-making processes⁵⁸. It is worth making the caveat at this stage that a lot of respondents had little to say about BASIC/SPACE/TA facility because they had not engaged with outputs. Accordingly, the responses outlined above are only representative of those who engaged with SPACE, which represents a minority of respondents.

1.3.5 BASIC's contribution to change

Figure 1 illustrates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are directly relevant (highlighted in blue) to SPACE's support to FCDO Somalia. BASIC's direct contribution to change in Somalia has, until now, been limited to the output level, focussing advice and research related results. Referring to the Kirkpatrick model⁵⁹ discussed in the BASIC Evaluation inception report, BASIC's inputs in Somalia reached the reaction level, providing engaging and relevant outputs and meeting client expectations. Lack of capacity building means that the going beyond the Kirkpatrick's Reaction level is not applicable in this context.

Figure 6.4: BASIC's Theory of Change and Relevance to Assignments in Somalia



Source: BASIC programme document

Results supported through BASIC

This section focusses on investigating SPACE's contribution to changes in Somalia, looking at FCDO's use of SPACE, potential indirect results and how these are reflected in output statements. This section will also consider the validity of the ToC's assumptions within the Somalia context and consider other enablers and constraints.

SPACE's contribution to changes in Somalia are largely limited to FCDO and reflected in specific outputs. The localisation framework represents *high quality advice and research provided for the design and delivery of country plans, policies and programmes*. Aligned with the BRCiS April 2021 vision statement, outlining the need for localisation to improve programme impact and sustainability, it provides evidence and approaches on which FCDO can draw on to design, develop or contribute to programming with a stronger localisation focus. That said, there is no evidence to date to indicate that has already been done.

Although there is no evidence to date to indicate this has been done, there will be plenty of opportunities to as FCDO continues to push the localisation agenda in line with its strategy and international commitments.

Future engagement around localisation could deliver outcomes. There is an expectation that the localisation framework will be used to inform FCDO Somalia country plans and policies around localisation in alignment with FCDO SP strategy and key international policy commitments. With BRCiS II running until March 2022¹³ and BASIC increasing its engagements in Somalia^{14, 15} there may be opportunities for BASIC to provide technical assistance supporting localisation agenda within the BRCiS programme. This would have the potential to contribute towards the *design and implementation of new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems*.

The Light Touch Review (LTR) of Donor Cash Principles signifies another result, where SPACE has delivered *high quality policy relevant research and advice, informing the design and delivery of country plans, policies and programmes*. The LTR and its scoping discussions with donors supported the development of the FCDO's cash programming strategy¹⁶, focussing on existing modalities and reinforcing the government's social protection mechanisms, as well as supporting the agenda of shock responsive approaches to safety net programming. A similar assessment can be made of the Somalia case study, representing a key bit of evidence that can inform future FCDO planning and programming. With the purpose of the case study to "document the scaling up of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic"¹⁷, it offers in-depth contextual analysis around needs caused by climate shocks, such as flooding and locust infestations (most severe), as well as the pandemic itself. As such, once finished, it will enable FCDO to situate and adjust its plans to respond most effectively to changes in context.

The LTR also highlights SPACE's responsiveness to user needs and adapting to contextual changes. The LTR provides a good example where SPACE pivoted slightly away from a COVID-19 only lens (although still providing useful evidence and analysis on that front) and supported FCDO to develop better understanding of emerging SP landscape in Somalia. That being said, one might question why, after realising that SPACE's COVID-19 lens wasn't well suited to the Somalia context and would benefit more from BASIC's more general TA, a BASIC TA project wasn't brought in to replace SPACE's services.

Reach of SPACE outputs beyond FCDO is hard to determine. For instance, while the LTR was shared across the donor group, the extent to which it was engaged with is unclear. While some respondents had mentioned seeing it, it wasn't referenced on its own or brought up as a key output from SPACE. This lack of reach combined with limited engagement with other SP stakeholders previously outlined in section 4.2 means that externally facing outputs and outcomes within the BASIC ToC have, until now, not been explored or tested in the Somalia case.

¹³ FCDO Devtracker, 2021. <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-1092236-BG190/transactions>

¹⁴ FCDO Cash and Social Protection Adviser SoW, 2021

¹⁵ KII Group 1 & 2: FCDO, Aug 2021

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ SPACE Somalia Case Study, June 2021.

However, this highlights potential opportunities – around research dissemination, stakeholder engagement, and coordination - for BASIC to explore during future engagements. With well-established Social Protection coordination mechanisms operating in Somalia there are openings for BASIC to contribute towards new or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships across the humanitarian, climate resilience and SP sectors and supporting greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives.

Validity of assumptions

Table 6.6 outlines assumptions from the BASIC ToC. An assessment of the validity of each assumption at the input to output and output to outcome levels is made in the third column. Assumptions linking outcomes to impact have been removed because it is too early to comment on these considering the still very early level of contribution that has been identified within the Somalia case so far.

Table 6.6: Assessment of relevance of BASIC ToC assumptions within Somalia case

ToC Linkages	Assumptions	Validity
Assumptions linking inputs to outputs:	FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises.	Valid
	BASIC has the flexibility to adapt to major contextual changes including new shocks and the FCDO reprioritisation exercise.	Valid
	There is sufficient technical expertise and capacity to deliver high quality advice and robust research in these contexts	These three assumptions can largely be grouped around context, and in the case of Somalia, not holding because of a lack of contextual understanding from the technical expertise. For instance, the need for or lack of local expertise was cited during KIIs and the appropriateness of advice was questioned around the Localisation Framework. Moreover, both SPACE team members and stakeholders explained that lack of time available to researchers for delivery meant that they were unable to provide sustained support or comprehensive outputs (as required) and more generally lacked capacity.
Assumptions linking outputs to outcomes:	International consultants and researchers delivering BASIC provide advice which is relevant and appropriate. There is adequate commitment, and financial and human resource at country level (in FCDO, governments or agencies) to implement new or strengthened plans, policies and programmes	
	International consultants and researchers delivering BASIC generate evidence which is relevant and appropriate. In-country researchers have sufficient networks and capacity to engage key stakeholders and promote uptake of research. Users are able to access evidence and understand its applicability to their own contexts. Staff turnover amongst users and policymakers does not prevent uptake of research and evidence.	
	FCDO posts have the absorptive capacity to utilise BASIC outputs and link to their influencing work. Buy in from senior FCDO personnel is sufficient to support high level influencing agenda.	Does not hold, largely due to FCDO Somalia being in a transitional phase which has reduced absorptive capacity.
	BASIC workstreams collaborate effectively to maximise cross-programme linkages, coordination and synergies.	Does not hold because SPACE was the only BASIC workstream to engage in Somalia and there was no collaboration with other workstreams during delivery
	BASIC collaborates effectively with other stakeholders to achieve capacity strengthening and influencing outcomes.	Does not hold. There was limited collaboration with stakeholders – mainly around localization – and the effectiveness was mitigated and outputs had limited reach

Enablers and constraints

SPACE's contributions, alone, are insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Some factors been identified as key enablers to achieving results in Somalia include:

- **Working within the existing (albeit still nascent) Social Protection space in Somalia.** Collaborating with other donors by sharing research and learning and working closely with the FGS who are looking to develop capacity and take ownership over the development and delivery of its social protection programmes⁶⁰. The SP system in Somalia is still in its early days, which means there are opportunities to support its growth and development
- **Long-term BASIC engagements with FCDO Somalia.** Short-termism of SPACE's support to FCDO Somalia was cited as an important issue inhibiting SPACE's ability to deliver results against the ToC⁶¹. Accordingly, FCDO Somalia's request for long-term Cash and Social Protection Adviser⁶² to support the design of FCDO's approach to humanitarian and safety net cash programming, policy development and systems strengthening through its next humanitarian and resilience programme signifies a key step towards long-term BASIC support.
- **Engaged and well-resourced FCDO team.** As per the assumption, *FCDO posts are sufficiently engaged to identify windows of opportunity for reform and draw on BASIC TA strategically to promote use of SP approaches in crises*, a well engaged and resourced FCDO team at post is a key enabler. While to date, the FCDO team has been more engaged than well-resourced, this has changed with the introduction of a new SDA at FCDO Somalia⁶³.

On the other hand, there are some important constraints on BASIC's ability to bring about outcome level change in Somalia, which include:

- **Lack of local expertise integrated within BASIC delivery.** BASIC has to date not prioritised the use of local expertise to provide support to country offices. This was the case in Somalia, and it affected the relevance of some of the delivery and may have constrained SPACE's ability to have wider reach beyond FCDO and to some degree, other international donor agencies.⁶⁴
- **Challenging and uncertain context.** Political instability and continued threat from Al-Shabab complicates the roll out of national and government led SP system.

1.3.6 Conclusions and issues for further consideration

Overall SPACE inputs in Somalia have been well received and proved useful in informing FCDO Somalia strategy and programming. The targeted and responsive elements of SPACE's service were well suited to FCDO Somalia's needs and outputs met user expectations. That said, the short-term modality of SPACE's engagements meant that more in-depth delivery, sustained support, and wider reach beyond FCDO users was out of scope. The request for long-term support through the Cash and Social Protection Adviser offers a good opportunity to address this constraint.

The need to integrate context into BASIC delivery in Somalia is something which should be considered carefully. This support could materialise through the use of Somali experts to support delivery.

FCDO's engagement with SPACE was good, albeit limited by lack of capacity due to a team in transition. Increasing capacity through positions with scope to focus on SP in Somalia is key to making the most of BASIC's technical assistance and FCDO Somalia priorities with Somalia's emerging SP system and the wider policy commitments.

Considering the evidence gaps outlined in section 1 and the nascent quality of the SP system in Somalia, there are opportunities for BASIC Research to contribute to the growth and development of SP in Somalia. Targeted research could allow FCDO to increase its influencing capabilities across the busy donor network in Somalia.

Impending sustained support from the TA workstream can support FCDO develop its role and relations within SP coordination mechanisms. This would also enable BASIC's engagements to reach beyond FCDO, supporting the needs of other immediate users at a local, government and donor level.

Lines of enquiry to explore in future rounds of the case study include:

- Impact of the new long-term Cash and Social Protection Adviser
- How BASIC contributes to coordination and government level engagement around social protection in Somalia.
- Whether BASIC Research ultimately engages in Somalia and evaluating contributions or determining where contributions might have been made.
- Whether BASIC can increase its reach to other stakeholders and national government and consider impact.
- Efforts BASIC has made to contextualise its work in Somalia.

1.4 Yemen

1.4.1 Context

Prior to the current conflict, Yemen was already one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa region with widespread food insecurity, malnutrition, and poor health, exacerbated by structural underdevelopment and widespread poverty.

Six years of conflict have displaced over 4 million people. Most IDPs have been displaced for two years or longer. It is estimated that 20.7 million people need some form of humanitarian and protection assistance. The humanitarian situation was aggravated in 2020 by escalating conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, disease outbreaks, torrential rains and flooding, a desert locust plague, economic collapse, a fuel crisis across northern governorates and reduced humanitarian aid. The size of Yemen's economy has shrunk by more than half since the conflict began and public services have been decimated. The operating environment is extremely restricted, characterized by extensive access challenges and insecurity.⁶⁵

Efforts to implement the Stockholm Agreement of 2018, which established a ceasefire and introduced other measures intended to pave the way for a wider political solution, are ongoing. However, confrontations involving the Government of Yemen, supported by the Saudi-led coalition, and the Ansar Allah authorities continue and a comprehensive political settlement remains elusive.

The national Social Protection system

Prior to the war there were several established social assistance mechanisms – although of debateable effectiveness.⁶⁶

- **The Social Welfare Fund (SWF) was the single largest social assistance program in Yemen.** In 2014 cash transfers under the SWF covered 1.5 million beneficiary households, representing 29.1% of the population. The impact of the SWF was limited by the low adequacy of its transfer value, targeting errors (both of inclusion and exclusion), and the weakness of delivery systems for payments, grievance redress and monitoring. The SWF suspended payments to beneficiaries in 2015.
- **The Cash for Work program, one of the largest operated under the Social Fund for Development (SFD)** was launched in 2008 following the global food crisis, as a shock-responsive instrument to supplement the SWF program by addressing temporary (rather than chronic) poverty. Despite its adoption as a safety net program, its coverage remained relatively low (at 2 percent of the national and 3 percent of the rural population in 2014).

Informal transfers were another important source of assistance to households and included remittances (11 percent coverage), zakat (10 percent), and other charitable transfers (8 percent).

The World Bank has sought to maintain and sustain key national social protection institutions through the period of conflict. In 2017, the World Bank launched the IDA funded Emergency Crisis response Project (ECRP). Under this it partnered with UNICEF, to launch the Emergency Cash Transfer (ECT) program to resume cash transfer payments to SWF beneficiaries. The ECT retained the SWF beneficiary list and transfer values. However, implementation was managed by UNICEF with private banks responsible for payments rather than through post offices and in practice a limited role for the SWF.⁶⁷ In addition, the ECRP partnered with UNDP to sustain the SFD programs.

The strategy for maintaining state institutions is evolving as the conflict has become protracted. The initial strategy of maintaining the key national institutions was predicated on the hope that the

conflict would be quickly resolved.⁶⁸ As the conflict has become protracted this strategy has been reviewed and adapted. The strategic decision to maintain distributions based on the 2014 beneficiary lists and transfer values has proved harder to justify. Equally the marginalisation of SWF from the direct management has reduced Yemeni participation and ownership. Consequently, a decision has been taken to transition the management of the ECT to the SFD.⁶⁹ As the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) is the legally mandated entity for the implementation of the UCT, the long-term goal is to eventually transition the program back to the SWF, once the conditions permit.

Humanitarian social transfers

The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan has three strategic objectives: (1) Preventing disease outbreaks and reducing morbidity and mortality (2) Preventing famine, malnutrition and restoring livelihoods, and (3) Protecting and assisting civilians. The second objective, which encompasses the provision of social transfers, targets the largest number of beneficiaries and represents the bulk of the humanitarian appeal. This includes emergency food assistance – in the form of food commodities, cash and vouchers, and improving access to livelihood opportunities, increasing household incomes, and rehabilitating food security assets and infrastructure.

The humanitarian food assistance response is fragmented amongst a large number of partners, with challenges to coherence and coordination. Assistance is provided by 90 operational partners in 2021 coordinated under the Food and Agriculture Security Cluster – including UN agencies and INGOs. While there has been some progress towards ensuring coordinated actions amongst these actors significant challenges remain in terms of establishing standardised targeting criteria, consistent transfer amounts, coordinated payment mechanisms and common complaints and feedback mechanisms. Coordination and information sharing amongst agencies was noted to be weak, including data exchange. In practice it is noted that the provision of humanitarian food assistance is effectively dominated by the World Food Programme whose operations dwarf the contributions of other humanitarian actors.

There has been a progressive push towards the increased use and coordination of cash-based programming. This is grounded in commitments in the 2016 Grand Bargain and the UN Common Cash Statement. The use of cash and voucher programmes began in Yemen before the current crisis, mainly delivered through the Social Welfare Fund, however the collapse of the Post Office system used for transfers raised questions on its continued viability. Humanitarian partners have committed to the increasing use of (multi-purpose) cash assistance as an emergency response tool and made progress with implementation, however, cash still only represents a fraction of the assistance provided. The Cash and Markets Working Group supports partners to plan and deliver cash and voucher programming including MPCA programmes.

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus is an increasingly prominent part of the international response. There is a huge humanitarian caseload and a growing recognition that beneficiaries need to transition to longer-term development support. There is a reinvigorated interest in working on development issues now rather than waiting for the war to end. This was articulated by several key humanitarian actors in terms of working on “more sustainable livelihoods” rather than engaging in support to improving social protection systems, which kept the response within their direct responsibility for implementation. The potential of using cash as an entry point to enhance social protection linkages is widely acknowledged. In practical terms significant challenges to operationalising the nexus were noted, with a growing consensus on the need to build referral mechanisms to transition beneficiaries of emergency assistance to longer-term livelihoods assistance. An illustrative stakeholder comment was that *“We would like to make connections between the same list of beneficiaries in the*

database of SWF, from one hand to our existing programs working in other sectors, such as livelihoods or nutrition projects.”

1.4.2 Origins and scope of BASIC support

The first round of BASIC TA support to FCDO (DFID) in Yemen was a study on ‘Linking humanitarian cash and social protection’ conducted in 2019. The purpose of this analysis was to contribute to and support improved outcomes of humanitarian cash and social assistance in Yemen. This was a broadly framed initial study that included: a mapping of existing social protection and humanitarian cash programmes in Yemen, a review of the capacity, complementarity and limitations of existing mechanisms to advise on strengthening a future transition to government ownership and increase the capacity to achieve humanitarian and resilience objectives, and political economy analysis to identify drivers of change.

Following from one of the key recommendations of the initial study a second round of BASIC support was commissioned in early 2020 to provide a Social Protection and Humanitarian Cash Linkages Donor Coordinator based half time in Amman. However, in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic it became impractical to proceed with this placement – with both travel curtailed and it being superseded by the immediate priority of Covid-19 response.

The resources allocated for a donor coordinator were flexibly repurposed. The original position was redesigned into four discrete pieces of work. The first analysed Covid-19 impacts on vulnerable populations and advised on appropriate responses. Following this there was a shift to supporting the development of an FCDO business case and strategy to build food security in Yemen. This included an analysis of the effectiveness of “cash plus” and livelihood approaches, an analysis of the barriers and incentives to drawing together humanitarian and social protection systems in Yemen and an assessment of the feasibility of the ambition of building a social protection system. Finally, there was a shift back towards the original design intent with an analysis of coordination mechanisms and the establishment of a donor cash and social protection working group.

SPACE resources were used to continue supporting the development and rollout of the FCDO strategy in Yemen. An initial short SPACE assignment was used to conduct an early market engagement with NGOs in Yemen to understand lessons learnt on the effectiveness of cash programming and coordination and gauge NGOs/UN agencies appetite in harmonising cash programmes as a step towards a social protection system. A second SPACE assignment was provided to support SFD’s approach to targeting and evidence-based programming.

The main support provided to FCDO Yemen by BASIC TA and SPACE, as outlined in Table 6.7 below.

Table 6.7: Overview of BASIC TA and SPACE support to FCDO Yemen

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
1	2019	BASIC TA	Framework Development for Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen	Internal reports produced for Inception Phase and two Phases of implementation.
			Initial scoping and mapping exercise followed by conversations with partners on the way forward	Only last report available for review by the evaluation team.
2	2020	BASIC TA	Yemen Social Protection and Humanitarian Cash Linkages Donor Coordinator	N/A

#	Date(s)	BASIC TA or SPACE?	Summary	Deliverables
			Original ToR were reworked in light of Covid-19 pandemic	
2A	March - April 2020		Needs assessment and options paper for potential cash and/or social protection response to COVID-19 pandemic	Report covering situational analysis and needs assessment, vulnerability analysis, a risk analysis and scenario planning and programming options.
2B	May – June 2020		Evidence review, gap analysis and value-for-money & risk assessment of cash-plus and complementary livelihoods programming in Yemen	Report providing a definition of cash plus programming, an evidence and VFM review and a gap analysis.
2C	July – August 2020		Action plan of technical priorities, informed by political economy analysis, to support cash harmonisation	Report on (a) the political economy analysis of the barriers and incentives of key stakeholders (UN agencies, SFD, NGOs, de facto authorities, GOY) to engage with cash harmonisation and coordination and (b) an assessment of the feasibility and desirability of priorities and social protection system building ambition.
2D	September – December 2020		Cash Reform Strategy	Report presenting a vision, stakeholder analysis, mapping of harmonisation efforts on-going, a workplan and a rolling engagement strategy. External paper on Donor Cash and Social Protection Working Group Workplan.
3	2020	SPACE	Roundtable Meeting on NGO Cash Programming in Yemen	Mindmap summarising the workshop outcomes.
4	2020/21	SPACE	Mapping and review of prioritisation: Social Fund for Development, Yemen	Analysis of current SFD approaches to programme and project prioritization and followed by conclusions and recommendations.

It was also noted that a global level “Review and Analysis of Identification and Registration systems in protracted and recurrent crises (MIS in Crises)” was commissioned by BASIC in 2019 that included a substantive case study of Yemen. The case study of Yemen (together with South Sudan) was presented as part of internal report, but not the external report.

The design of the Research workstream was on-going at the time of the case study. Stakeholder consultations had been conducted with a range of individuals and organisations and a background position paper had been prepared by IDS on social protection and cash programmes in Yemen. Based on this an initial concept note on research themes had been prepared and shared with FCDO for comment.

1.4.3 BASIC Delivery

What worked

BASIC support and deliverables have generally been well received by FCDO. The following key themes emerged from key informant interviews:

The clear definition of deliverables by FCDO Yemen was important in ensuring the utility of products. The case study emphasised that the opportunities were highly context specific. The high level of engagement of FCDO Yemen posts in defining the BASIC and SPACE deliverables was critical to the effective use of BASIC resources. There was a learning from the initial TA assignment – by both

FCDO and consultants – on the importance of a clearer articulation of the scope of the assignments and a more collaborative relationship. The second TA assignment was broken down into numerous smaller sub-assignments with a clear purpose and audience. Having FCDO Yemen in control of the process also facilitated internal coherence across BASIC providers. There are clear signs that the BASIC TA & Research inputs are being synergised at the level of the FCDO Business Case.

BASIC displayed a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to evolving needs and a changing context. Strong flexibility and adaptability were demonstrated at multiple levels. The initial BASIC assignment included a contract break and was one of the first contracts to do this. This allowed adjustment for subsequent phases. The second assignment was adapted rapidly and appropriately to the impacts of Covid-19. DAI was also noted to be accommodating to the consequences of the FCDO re-prioritisation exercise. In practice BASIC TA and SPACE resources were used interchangeably – as TA resources were used to respond rapidly to Covid-19 related needs and SPACE resources used to maintain momentum on the business case development.

High quality and experienced consultants were provided in a timely way. There is a strong appreciation of the high quality and experience of consultants provided. These were seen to do more than simply compensate for inadequate advisor time and complemented FCDO posts by adding value in technical areas and by bringing in cross country learning. TAs were also seen by some – but not all stakeholders – as able to project a distinct identity from FCDO posts – for example this was important in coordination role.

Contextual knowledge and understanding of the consultants was mixed and the value of local consultants was highlighted. However, the use of same consultants for repeated assignments helped to overcome this constraint and was important in driving efficiency. A sufficient length of consultancy was important in building understanding and relationships.

The initial round of recruitments was noted to be somewhat cumbersome, taking three months. However, this was reduced to a month in subsequent rounds as recruitment procedures were streamlined. A smooth recruitment was reported from the consultant's point of view, even during the Covid-19 crisis. A proportionate allocation of time to deliver outputs under BASIC TA, although SPACE was noted to be higher pressure and quite erratic – with intensive short-term work.

TA consultants operated effectively to promote coherence and coordination. Strong partnerships in implementation were noted, for example, the partnership of the TA with the CaLP consultant on a concurrent study.⁷⁰ The use of BASIC TA consultants to help develop BASIC research plan also promoted coherence and synergies between these workstreams.

Challenges and limitations

Several challenges were also noted in the delivery of BASIC services. These included:

Constrained access by the consultants to key stakeholders. Significant access constraints were in place to Yemen related to both the conflict and Covid-19 which compromised direct access to stakeholders. International consultants felt that the inability to develop direct relationships and to make full use of national consultants compromised the ability to appreciate the situation on the ground. There was a particular constraint in terms of working with national authorities and engaging them and other national partners in the process, which was compounded by the limited political engagement by FCDO with the authorities in the north. In theory, national consultants could meet with Government but also faced travel restrictions and limited time. It was argued that in 2019 access for international consultants would have been possible, capitalising on UN agency access, but was not considered for budgetary reasons.

Stakeholder access was also compromised by the dispersed location of international actors – the FCDO Yemen team alone was spread across three locations making it hard to engage with the office as a whole. Staff turnover was a further complication and challenge. This has been particularly problematic when several key actors have departed simultaneously.

There was a significant degree of overlap and replication of studies of the social protection and humanitarian nexus in Yemen. There was a significant overlap of a number of similar studies of cash reform and the nexus conducted over a similar period by BASIC with CaLP, the World Bank, the EU and UNDP. Each study had a somewhat distinct purpose and was important in building institutional ownership and there was some collaboration amongst the authors. However, there was a sense that the core analysis could have been done more efficiently, with a consensus established on the context.

This overlap was compounded by the fact that the BASIC reports were predominantly developed purely for an internal FCDO audience. There was extremely limited leveraging of outputs as a public good. Reporting was often strictly to FCDO, and the findings were not disseminated widely beyond a small number of wrap-up workshops. While the sensitive political context in Yemen did not encourage open sharing of information, it was argued that more could have been done to publicly share revised versions.

There was limited evidence of BASIC exploiting global-country synergies. Cross country learning drawing on BASIC experience appeared largely dependent on individual consultants. There was not a clear mechanism apparent to either share relevant global experiences down to the country, or draw from the country experience to inform global workstreams. There appeared to be limited capacity or empowerment of the TA provider to add value across country assignments. The BASIC MIS study was commissioned globally with global interviews with two detailed country case studies including Yemen. The findings of the study had potentially significant implications. However, it took 6 months for FCDO to agree to an edited version to be published and this did not include the country case studies. There appeared to have been little use or follow-up of this study within Yemen by FCDO or others.

1.4.4 BASIC's contribution to change


Figure 1 shows the BASIC theory of change (ToC). The elements of the ToC which are most relevant to BASIC's support to FCDO Yemen are explored in this section.

Direct results of BASIC assignments

The main direct result of BASIC TA has been in supporting the development of FCDO business case and other internal decision-making processes. Stakeholders were clear that the primary direct use of BASIC and SPACE outputs was by FCDO Yemen itself. The various outputs had been heavily drawn on by posts to support all stages of the business case development including the pre-concept note decision making and support to development of concept note and related business case, through both input to the technical content and evidence for submission to Ministers. BASIC provided posts with an important challenge function prior to turning outward to engage with other stakeholders.

Critically, this confirmed that while the overall vision remained a shock responsive national social protection system, an incremental strategy was required for achieving this. The immediate strategy focussed on reforming the humanitarian system, while at the same time social protection systems are kept on the agenda and to be brought into the conversation progressively. At this point it was not judged realistic to move directly to embedding crisis response in Government systems. The BASIC analysis helped to illustrate how poorly coordinated and incoherent the current humanitarian response is. It also pointed to important evidence gaps on the effectiveness of livelihood interventions to complement cash transfers.

Figure 6.5: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to Yemen



Source: BASIC programme documents

In addition, BASIC products guided the spending of C-19 crisis reserve. This provided help in thinking through impacts of COVID and mapping of response architecture and supported decisions on additional funding to SWF, WFP and NGOs.

Going beyond the business case, BASIC was also credited with helping FCDO to develop an influencing strategy and push forward on improved coordination. The BASIC analysis highlighted how to progress with the agenda of reforming humanitarian cash assistance there needed to be a coalition to make this work. Within this area BASIC played an important role in the establishment of donor social protection and cash working group. A framework and workplan for the group was established where different donors took responsibility for leading on different areas of cash reform. This WG was positively received by members as a useful addition to established coordination forums. It was seen to effectively bring together key humanitarian and development donors – including the World Bank – and provide a forum for interesting discussions. However, specific progress against the workplan objectives was difficult to track and stakeholders cautioned that progress is necessarily slow and incremental. The lack of a dedicated coordinator risks a loss of momentum and donors pursuing diverse priorities.

In parallel, FCDO has had a strategy of building up the Cash and Markets Working Group (CMWG) in parallel to donor WG. An early BASIC recommendation was for FCDO to fund a CashCap advisor to the CMWG. They have reportedly been effective in motivating this group and donors have encouraged a stronger involvement of development actors including UNICEF, UNDP, UNOPS and NGOs. The CMWG and Donor WG workplans were harmonised with BASIC support.

Technical support was provided by BASIC to inform the targeting approaches used by SFD but the impact of this remains uncertain. A SPACE assignment mapped SFD's approach to targeting and evidence-based programming at the portfolio and program levels and draw some key conclusions on potential improvements which can be taken forward through the development of the new Crisis Response Plan (CRP) 2021-2023. This accompanied the shift in responsibilities for distributing cash assistance from UNICEF/SWF to SFD. However, the preliminary feedback suggested that this assignment in itself had limited results. It was primarily viewed as an opportunity for FCDO to learn about SFD processes. Work on transforming their systems was understood to already be in-process and led internally.

While yet to established, there was significant interest in added value that BASIC research could offer. There was significant interest in the potential added value of the BASIC research workstream. This was rooted in various considerations of how research differs from – and adds value to – the contribution of TA. Firstly, and critically, there are large knowledge gaps evident in Yemen. With limited field access there is little information and there is clearly an appetite for BASIC to fill a primary data gap. Secondly, there was an appreciation of the benefits of longer-term engagement by the research team. The prospect of a three-year consistent presence was valued in contrast to intermittent and short-term TA assignments.

The sequencing of starting the research after the TA may have (unintended) benefits. Some stakeholders argued that the groundwork done by TA could help to set the research agenda. However, there was no immediate consensus on what the priorities for research should be. Numerous gaps were identified ranging from livelihood and resilience building opportunities to climate change, political economy analysis to how to empower communities.

1.4.5 Contribution to other results

While BASIC evidence contributed to influencing donors there was less evidence that it contributed to building political will in national authorities. There was little immediate evidence of

BASIC in contributing to advocacy efforts amongst stakeholders as it had very limited direct visibility. Few outputs were shared with the wider community and stakeholders commented that if advocacy was a goal, then it could have projected its own outputs better. However, FCDO has been an important player in consistently pushing messages on using cash, the nexus linkages and the use of national institutions to UN agencies. These messages were in turn underpinned by the work of BASIC.

However, there was little evidence of even any indirect pathways to influencing national institutions. There is no established donor presence in Yemen apart from ECHO. Some stakeholders referenced a desire to normalise relationships with the authorities in both the north and the south, as there is current minimal direct engagement by donors who rely on UN agencies as interlocutors. Even the objective of engagement of quasi-governmental institutions of SWF and SFD is unclear – whether this was in fact about building a national system or building something in parallel. Some stakeholders perceived that the position of FCDO in supporting national institutions was compromised as it was not seen as a humanitarian agency but as interested political actor with regional allegiances. Nor was it clear that the starting point should be “influencing” national institutions as opposed to supporting them in their own strategic priorities. The agenda remains driven by international actors – and the relevance to priorities of national authorities uncertain.

The added value of BASIC in individual and institutional capacity building appears to reside at the strategic rather than technical level. While part of the BASIC ToC, in practice the comparative advantage and role of BASIC in capacity building efforts remains uncertain. It was clear that technical knowledge and skills – for example in relation to the use of cash – are available from a variety of other sources including UN agencies, CaLP and the Cash CAP. The depth and breadth of experience in these agencies was generally perceived to exceed what was available through BASIC. The initial experience of supporting SFD in targeting and prioritisation points to the need for a sustained partnership in building capacity and the limitations of using short-term technical assistance.

Stakeholders pointed to quite distinct and complementary roles for BASIC and other agency provided assistance – with the former providing more strategic role and the latter more technical assistance. This is aligned with the observation that BASIC benefits from not being tied to any implementing agency agendas.

Basic demonstrated limited progress towards integrating cross-cutting issues including GESI, climate change and conflict sensitivity. The inclusion of GESI perspectives within the BASIC reports is still developing. It was acknowledged that the first rounds of BASIC assignments did not include a strong GESI perspective and had a relatively light GESI analysis. For example, there was no reference to a gender situational analysis in relation to the provision of social assistance. Interestingly, stakeholders were unclear how a GESI perspective could have benefitted these initial studies given the strong institutional focus. With the introduction of SPACE, GESI expertise was assigned to each specific assignment and reports tended to include a dedicated gender section. However, it was unclear the extent to which these contributions helped to shape a strategic approach to GESI in the business case. It was however reported that the last SPACE report had triggered a request from SFD to FCDO for further gender support.

Progress on integrating other cross-cutting issues was even less developed. Climate change was acknowledged as an important but under-developed issue in Yemen so the potential consideration of linkages to social protection was welcomed in principle. However, in practice only a few and somewhat tangential entry points had been identified such as consideration of water management in livelihood options. Despite being firmly rooted in a conflict driven crisis, there was little evidence of the links between social protection and social cohesion or conflict mitigation being considered.

1.4.6 Enablers and constraints

The role of FCDO posts and programmes in driving forward change is central. FCDO posts are clearly critical in linking BASIC outputs to making change happen. As one stakeholder said *“Change ultimately depends on willingness and capacities of FCDO team on the ground. Consultants generate a wealth of knowledge which is fine. But what is often lacking is the willingness to put in the hours at the level of the country teams.”* Longer-term BASIC assignments are helpful but not a substitute for the active engagement of FCDO posts.

As a complement to this the importance of a shared vision across the FCDO country team, including senior management support, was critical. This is seen as important for both sustained commitment to support for this agenda within FCDO and for capitalising on political channels for advocacy. Unfortunately the case study was not able to interview senior FCDO staff in-country to determine how effective BASIC had been in influencing throughout the Yemen team.

Important synergies between FCDO advocacy and programming were also identified. An important influencing channel lies in tying funding to a strategic vision – such as influencing key UN actors. Relying on influencing through good ideas alone was seen to be far less effective given the array of countervailing agency agendas.

Coordinated action by donors and implementing agencies is critical to making change happen – but challenging to achieve. Implementing agencies were found to be focussed on their own programmes and priorities rather than sector wider challenges and opportunities. Competition within the sector was also noted as an inhibitor to collaboration. Consequently, change was acknowledged to depend on a push from donors and the key is to build donor coordination and coherence around a common agenda.

However, building donor coherence has not been straightforward. The bifurcation of humanitarian and development donors is challenging – with the mandates of specific agencies pushing against coordination across the nexus. As one humanitarian donor said *“We want to improve national systems but not reasonable to expect humanitarians to assume this responsibility given other immediate demands in Yemen.”* Many donors have strict limits imposed on their ability to partner with the various authorities in Yemen which further constrains a nexus approach. Nor do all donors engage in these discussions. Limited technical capacity amongst many donors was noted – with only a small subset actively driving this agenda. Within this group a lot depends on personalities and progress is vulnerable to the rotation of key staff. There is a lack of engagement of important Gulf States donors in humanitarian and development coordination structures.

While funding is more diversified – and includes development financing from the World Bank – overall availability of financing is diminishing. The operating context overall is one of diminishing resources against continuing needs. This places significant stress on the response and an emphasis on cost savings. There is an evident tension between impacts of more “effective assistance” and “lower cost”. Nor is there the fiscal space to experiment with innovative and inclusive approaches.

1.4.7 Closing reflections

Issues to follow-up in future rounds of the case study:

- What is the future role for BASIC given the emergence of the Business Case?
- What role will research play in complementing TA assistance?
- How can engagement with national authorities be strengthened?

1.5 SPACE

1.5.1 Background

Scope of the learning case study

Learning case studies carried out by the evaluation are one-off studies which seek to explore whether and how engagements by individual BASIC workstreams deliver change. This learning case study focuses on the Social Protection Approaches to Covid-19 (SPACE) service, which accounted for over half of BASIC spending between April 2020 and August 2021.

The SPACE service

SPACE is a joint facility initiated by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in April 2020 in response to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, with funding from both UKAid and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. From December 2020, SPACE was also supported by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). FCDO funding to SPACE came to an end on 31 August 2021. Just over £1 million to SPACE; activities were co-financed by donors.

Services and products provided by the SPACE programme include direct support, publications and learning sessions. The service evolved considerably over time. The first phase of SPACE (April – September 2020) focused on immediate support to country level decisionmakers with thinking through how to establish, maintain or adapt systems and programmes to meet rapidly growing needs. The second phase (October 2020 – August 2021, including a costed extension) provided for more sustained country engagements where needed and introduced a focus on global level learning for audiences working on policy and operations.

1.5.2 SPACE in the BASIC Theory of Change

Figure 1 overleaf indicates the elements of the BASIC theory of change (ToC) which are most relevant to support provided by SPACE. Statements in boxes shaded in blue are directly relevant. Core activities undertaken by SPACE – *and relevant ToC causal pathways* – are:

- **Direct country engagement** when users engage directly with SPACE experts to obtain advice and assistance based on specific needs or issues. Support may be in the form of remote consultations through calls; document review (e.g. of proposals or reports); consolidated evidence around specific needs or knowledge gaps; or mapping in-country stakeholders and programmes engaged in the Covid-19 response. From the start of phase 2, direct support could be provided as short-term assistance (up to 5 days) or slightly longer technical support (up to 20 days).

For technical assistance (TA) activities the directly relevant ToC step is: provision of high quality advice (1, in figure 1 below) → new or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented (4). Also relevant to some country engagements is the ToC step: new or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships → greater coherence, coordination and synergies between actors and initiatives.


- **SPACE publications**, in the form of framing documents, thematic overviews, policy papers and documents to support implementation, are intended to assist users who are engaged in direct support, as well as a wider community of social protection (SP) and humanitarian cash implementers, in designing and delivering Covid-19 response programmes.

- SPACE experts also organise and participate in **learning events** including webinars and trainings, in order to share and discuss learning from social protection approaches to Covid-19 recovery and improve preparedness for future emergencies.

For both knowledge management and learning (KML) activities the directly relevant ToC step is: greater awareness, knowledge and learning generated across countries and agencies on social protection approaches in crises (2) → evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practices (5).

Whilst ToC outputs include targeted capacity building support, this has not formed a major part of SPACE delivery, except through learning events for FCDO and GIZ staff.

Figure 6.6: Elements of the BASIC theory of change of most relevance to SPACE



Source: BASIC programme documents

1.5.3 SPACE coverage and users

SPACE has supported 44 countries across sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. More than half of country level engagements have been with African countries, with relatively fewer in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, reflecting the existing structure of DFID and GIZ funding. The geographical coverage of the service was expanded to include the Pacific region with the onboarding of DFAT funding in December 2020. SPACE programme management has also actively sought to ensure representation across different types of contexts vis-à-vis humanitarian and national SP infrastructure (as set out in figure 1) by actively generating demand (several of the FCDO users interviewed indicated that they had received a direct offer of support from SPACE).

TA users are mostly FCDO and GiZ country offices, with some limited use of SPACE TA by multilateral agencies and country governments. Around half of country engagements have originated with requests from FCDO country offices, a third from those of GIZ or DFAT and a small number from agencies, most notably, UNICEF or WFP. FCDO requests were often related to addressing evidence needs to build and argue a case for policies and programming – most often but not limited to business case development. Requests were driven by a need not only for expert advice, but also to address the bandwidth limitations of in-country advisers, particularly during the initial pivot to Covid-19 response. FCDO staff interviewed during the course of this case study also indicated that they valued SPACE as a quasi-in-house source of rapid technical support, given the costly and time-consuming alternative of procuring and contracting expertise directly.

The SPACE TA model was not well suited to supporting country governments, except indirectly.

A handful of engagements involved direct support to country governments, usually facilitated by country offices or, in some instances, UNICEF. Being able to secure these kinds of requests has been a benefit of GIZ's involvement, with GIZ tending to work more directly with and through country governments than FCDO (see also section 5.1 below). Nevertheless, direct engagement with governments has been necessarily limited by the short timeframes for and remote nature of support offered by SPACE. Key informants (KIs) also observed that country offices were better placed than government counterparts to develop clear and well-defined requests for support.

KML publications targeted humanitarian and SP practitioners: FCDO and GIZ advisers and programme staff in country offices and central policy teams, national governments, other donors and UN agencies at both country and headquarters level, regional and thematic bodies, and the wider humanitarian and social protection communities of practice. In practice, evidence collected during baseline suggests that SPACE has built a strong brand at global level, with the most enthusiastic users policy or research organisations, but that awareness of SPACE publications in-country is relatively low (with some notable exceptions).

1.5.4 Composition and supply of expertise

Strengths

SPACE was characterised by the provision of high quality, diverse and impartial advice. Both users and SPACE experts themselves emphasised the high calibre of experts on the SPACE roster, with several pointing to the stellar reputations, and high level of influence with donors and agencies, of senior members of the SPACE team. They also observed that support was *practical* – targeted at the 'how' of responding to Covid-19 through SP approaches.

SPACE routinely deployed multidisciplinary teams, comprised of members with complementary skillsets. KIs emphasised that this was unusual for a call-down facility and improved the overall quality

of advice provided by integrating different perspectives and providing an internal source of challenge. The diversity of expertise on offer was facilitated, during the first phase, by parallel 'SPACE' and 'SPACE-H' contracts, which ensured access to both SP and humanitarian expertise (with these rosters subsequently integrated under SPACE 2).

The multi-donor funding structure ensured that SPACE did not – and, crucially, was not perceived to – drive any single donor agenda too concertedly. That users tended to view SPACE as an impartial source of advice enabled experts to build open and effective working relationships with in-country users and, in some instances, to facilitate policy dialogue between stakeholders. At the same time, where experts had previous experience of working in or with FCDO or GIZ, in addition to substantive expertise, this was perceived by users to be an added benefit which enabled support to feed directly into internal programme design and approval processes.

SPACE experts were well-placed to facilitate cross-country learning. SPACE experts found that having a view across different contexts, and from global policy to local implementation, was particularly beneficial during the initial response to the onset of Covid-19 (i.e. the first few months of the service) when they were primarily advising on options for horizontal and/or vertical expansion. Several users also pointed to the opportunity to learn from other country contexts as a benefit of SPACE support. Examples cited included: linking FCDO programmes across countries including Palestine and Zimbabwe to explore alternative delivery models for cash programming; providing examples to inform the evaluation of an emergency cash transfer (CT) seeking to support girl's education in South Sudan; and, in Jordan, synthesising evidence on the value for money of integrating refugee caseloads into national SP systems. Cross-country learning was facilitated by three waves of a cross-country synthesis document.

“SPACE operated as a multi-donor, globally-facing TA facility, with a really impressive range of experts, on demand and with an open client list – that hasn't really been done before. [SPACE teams] worked from the minutiae all the way up to global issues.”

KII interviewee

SPACE adapted successfully as user needs evolved. At the beginning of phase 1 short-term support of up to 5 days was sufficient for exploring delivery options for adapting existing social safety nets (SSNs), risks and mitigations, and enabled SPACE to respond to a large volume of country requests within a short period of time. After the first three months, the preponderance of requests and support shifted towards exploring specific operational issues such as registration, caseload expansion and Covid-safe payment mechanisms (i.e., from the 'what' to the 'how'). And, in phase 2, SPACE introduced medium-term assignments of up to 20 days to be able respond to country demand for more in-depth support, increasingly relating to developing strategies and laying the groundwork for Covid-19 recovery. KIs indicated that there were a few instances in which the maximum level of effort on offer was insufficient to respond to countries' needs; however, these larger requests appear increasingly to have been referred to BASIC TA during the last few months of the SPACE contract, which seems appropriate. Throughout, users reported that remote support was sufficient to meet their needs.

KIs consistently pointed to SPACE's integration of gender and inclusion expertise as a key strength of its delivery model. SPACE adopted a two-pronged approach, mainstreaming GESI, as well as undertaking targeted support (see table 1 below). These efforts related to both country and global level work and were enabled by funding from FCDO SPT's Gender-Responsive Social Protection (GSP) programme for a strong six person sub-team of GESI experts, led by a SPACE Deputy Team Leader specialised in gender, social protection and livelihoods (and in the context of a relatively weak market for consultants with expertise in both social protection and gender or social inclusion expertise).

Table 6.8: GESI in SPACE delivery

Area	Mainstreaming	Targeted activities
TA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All call down teams included a GESI expert, from the initial scoping call onwards. There was some variation in the level of input of GESI experts in assignments and, in turn, the value they were able to add – though experts and users report the quality of advice to be very good overall. SPACE overcame some minor management challenges relating to the GESI sub-team, who were deployed by DAI, but contracted by OPM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 call downs across 11 countries had a GESI focus. This number suggests that specific demand for and interest in support on gender-responsive and inclusive social protection is quite low. However, other key themes across SPACE assignments relate strongly to inclusion – e.g. expansion of safety nets to cover informal workers in response to Covid, and localisation (i.e. improved participation of local actors in SP design and implementation).
Tools, products and events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GESI matrices were developed to complement core strategy and decision matrices, which themselves integrated relevant issues across SP design and delivery considerations (e.g. targeting, transfer amounts, accountability mechanisms, and GBV prevention and response) and were deployed systematically, particularly in early assignments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A significant proportion of publications and blogs focused on GESI issues, including disability in targeting and identification, inclusive MIS, and practical tips for linking GBV and SP. Two GESI-focused internal FCDO events covering, respectively, Covid-19 and inclusive economic recovery. GESI clinics at socialprotection.org conference.

Limitations

An important, and growing, challenge has been securing the availability of SPACE experts who had not been asked to commit regular days to SPACE. Experts pointed to challenges they had encountered in managing the flow of SPACE assignments, and their time, in a context where requests were unpredictable but required very quick turnarounds. They also felt that the level of effort allocated was sometimes insufficient, and that the quality assurance process – whilst important – was disproportionate. Experts assessed that these factors had negatively affected the quality of outputs, required them to work significantly beyond their allotted days and/or incentivised them to deprioritise taking on SPACE assignments. Constraints on consultant availability have become more pronounced over time. This is perhaps the inevitable consequence of the SPACE service having recruited most of the foremost experts from a relatively small pool of international consultants: it is simply not feasible to maintain such a roster indefinitely, with consultants needing to service other clients or, in the case of academics, return to research they had put on hold, and therefore unable to continue to engage with SPACE at the same level. It is worth noting, however, that these challenges did not apply to the core team, all of whom had dedicated regular days to SPACE (see section 5 below).

SPACE made only limited use of local experts. The SPACE roster contained relatively little regional expertise on south-east Asia and the Pacific, which presented a challenge to providing a timely and effective service following the geographical expansion of the service with the addition of DFAT funding. More broadly, with most SPACE consultants northern European or northern American, the service has made very limited use of regional and national experts. Where local consultants have been involved in country assignments through other means (contracted directly by country offices, for instances) SPACE consultants emphasised the value added by their in-depth understanding of context and political economy as well as the opportunity for sustained engagement beyond the conclusion of assignments.

1.5.5 Institutional arrangements

Strengths

The initial institutional arrangements for SPACE were put in place extremely quickly – within approximately three weeks – in response to a surge in demand for support from country offices following the onset of the pandemic.

The multi-donor funding arrangement added considerable value, improving the accessibility, quality and efficiency of support provided:

- GIZ had originally been considering a smaller scale advisory service, but were able to increase their ambitions by working with FCDO, who had a sizeable existing delivery structure in place under BASIC. An auxiliary benefit of the resulting level of SPACE output was increased visibility for the donors involved, particularly GIZ, in the SP sector.
- The multi-donor approach also expanded the range of users: as noted above, whereas FCDO SPT's natural constituency was FCDO country offices, GIZ works more directly through country governments. DFAT coming on board expanded the geographical scope of the service (though note the limitations referenced in section 4.2 above).
- SPACE provided joint access to a limited pool of top experts (with each donor funding specific experts, whose time was then pooled). At the time of SPACE's inception, the Team Leader was under contract with GIZ. Reallocating some of her contracted days to SPACE enabled two donors to benefit from her expertise at the onset of the crisis.
- As noted in section 4.1 above, the joint facility strengthened the impartiality of advice provided.
- Joint outputs between donors strengthened their collaboration beyond SPACE – on policy issues being discussed in the sector, for instance.

An adaptive management approach – within the broad parameters of BASIC TAS – supported flexible and efficient delivery. Key aspects of this approach were:

- Quick identification of emerging needs by the SPACE team. By comparison, the BASIC TAS process would have required the joint development of ToRs by DAI and FCDO with a greater emphasis on specified objectives than needs.
- Flexible contracting arrangements (ToRs only) with countries which did not narrowly pre-define the parameters of assignments.
- Flexible key performance indicators (KPIs) whereby DAI was required to meet only half of specified targets, allowing for shifts in focus as needed.
- Regular process learning sessions (weekly for first three months, then bi-monthly and later monthly) to test and adapt delivery processes. Examples cited related to governance arrangements for donor engagement, as well as technical delivery (e.g how publications were scoped, resourced and quality assured).

SPACE differed from most call down services in that it had a core team, which allowed it to become more than the sum of its parts. The in-depth engagement of members of this core team across SPACE activities and over a longer period of time, helped build effective working relationships between experts, facilitated use of a set of core guidance documents to inform advice, and encouraged learning across assignments. The team included thematic and country leads, responsible for developing approaches and relationships.

“SPACE isn't a traditional call down, but a cohesive team of people working together over time, using similar framing and tools, and engaging repeatedly in countries...Trust between team members has made a difference.”

Programme funded posts (PfPs) were essential to identifying needs and maintaining strategic focus. PFP postholders who intersected with SPT and the relevant FCDO cadres, enabled the team to develop the SPACE ToR quickly, engage with countries and develop a pipeline of support needs informed by wider planning processes. The SPACE team perceived the SPT-funded post embedded within the delivery team to be particularly important for maintaining alignment with FCDO priorities in

the absence of a written social protection policy (examples cited included increasing a focus on climate in work in the Sahel).

A weekly coordination and management board enabled effective decision making, with donors describing it as a useful forum for feeding into strategy – including, for example, selection of topics for publications – and the SPACE delivery team as a means to ensure continuous alignment with donor priorities.

Limitations

The intersect between SPACE and BASIC TAS was somewhat unclear in practice. This can be ascribed in part to the evolution and protraction of the Covid-19 crisis; what began as a service providing discrete advice on rapidly adapting existing SSNs, broadened its scope over time as Covid-19 responses and recovery became intertwined with longer-term planning. In practice, some later assignments have not been directly related to Covid-19, as in Sudan, where SPACE supported the government's Family Support Programme cash transfer.¹⁸ It is also challenging, again in the later stages of SPACE, to discern a qualitative difference between support provided by the two services, especially in countries where the same experts have worked under both SPACE and BASIC TAS contracts (e.g. Yemen). This supports the decision to conclude funding to SPACE and shift focus to the new Technical Assistance Facility. Nevertheless, there is evidence of countries drawing strategically and effectively on both SPACE and BASIC TA. In Jordan, for example, BASIC TA support to the design of a five year programme was put on hold, and shorter-term support sought from SPACE, as FCDO pivoted to support the government with its Covid-19 response – and picked back up in autumn 2020.

Key informants pointed to some, manageable commercial challenges. These included, for DAI, differences in the contracting requirements of FCDO and GIZ. And, for some countries, unmet needs for support when requests were made at times when the overall SPACE contract was due to come to an end (and an extension had not yet been put in place).

1.5.6 Results

Output level

Key informants involved in delivery saw SPACE's ability to respond quickly to all requests – early on, within 36 hours, despite a surge in demand – as a key achievement. Users reiterated that SPACE was responsive, easy to use and able to provide the right resources at the right time (emphasising that this cannot always be taken for granted with TA facilities).

User feedback suggests that SPACE support generally met or exceeded expectations. Between the start of SPACE and the end of June 2021, the average client satisfaction score for SPACE assignments based on feedback forms was 4.19 (against a target of 3 and compared to an overall score for BASIC TA of 3.9).⁷¹ SPACE personnel also point to repeat requests from several SPACE users as an indication that support is meeting user's needs and expectations.⁷² Some key informants who were FCDO users (e.g. Pakistan) indicated that they had re-engaged SPACE for precisely that reason, whilst a government user in Sudan reported trying to maximise use of a particular expert before the service came to an end in August.

¹⁸ The Sudan Family Support Programme is a temporary cash transfer established to cushion the population against impacts of economic reforms undertaken as part of post-revolution debt relief.

Outcome level

Uptake of SPACE outputs is more challenging to gauge, despite considerable efforts on the part of the delivery team to monitor their use. Examples of uptake set out in quarterly reporting relate mainly to BASIC TAS assignments, possibly due to the shorter timeframes for SPACE assignments.⁷³ How exactly the type of support provided during the earliest stages – mapping actors / programming and exploring (and discarding) options for the initial Covid-19 response to inform decision making – translated (or not) into improved social protection responses is particularly challenging to capture.

The most tangible examples of SPACE support being implemented were where TA outputs fed directly into programme design. Most often, examples cited related to business cases for new or expanded programmes, which were subsequently implemented – as in Jordan and Pakistan. In Sudan, a government user reported having directly implemented improvements recommended by SPACE to the structure and content planned monitoring surveys for the government’s Family Support Programme (*‘New or strengthened country plans, policies, programmes and systems designed and implemented’*).

There is also evidence of SPACE TA outputs being used to further FCDO’s influencing objectives. Users (again, examples include both Jordan and Pakistan) reported having used SPACE outputs to make a case for policies or programmes internally (e.g., in submissions), as well as to inform negotiations with government and other partners. In DRC, SPACE supported FCDO to influence the government to implement a two-phased approach to determining eligibility for its new cash transfer (which meant that initial transfers could be paid far more quickly), by providing evidence-based feedback on design and facilitating stakeholder meetings. (*‘Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice’ in support of ‘More efficient social assistance in crises’*). At global level, SPACE has prepared briefs on key multilaterals to inform FCDO, GIZ and DFAT engagements (although how this support will be drawn on by the donors remains to be seen).

It is unclear whether the uptake of SPACE publications matches the volume of output. Users reported that SPACE had distinguished itself – and built a strong brand – through the high quality and practical orientation of its learning products, as well as the speed with which these were published compared to other sources. However, some SPACE experts questioned whether levels of uptake were sufficient to justify the quantity of outputs. SPACE is monitoring how many times specific publications are viewed, but not who exactly is accessing them, and to what end. That said, the evaluation did identify select instances of country-based staff and partners drawing on SPACE publications to inform policy and programme development. For example, WFP staff in Jordan reported using SPACE resources to inform their programming and that they had flagged SPACE as a useful resource to the government in the context of the Covid-19 response.⁷⁴ And, in Latin America, UNICEF translated some publications into Spanish for use in workshops with governments and agencies. (*‘Evidence used by governments, donors and agencies to inform policies and practice’*).

There is some limited evidence that SPACE learning events have built the capacity of FCDO and GIZ staff. Learning events appear to have been most beneficial for personnel who already had a solid grounding in humanitarian cash transfers or social protection, and were interested in building their understanding of specific technical issues (e.g. improving the interoperability of humanitarian and social protection systems). One staff member reported having deployed concepts and terminology learnt from SPACE events during country level discussions with the World Bank. Additionally, SPACE has supported WFP headquarters to identify areas for internal capacity building based on SPACE’s experience engaging with WFP country offices (although the results of this engagement are not yet known). (*‘Improved human and institutional capability and capacity’*).

Unintended results

An important auxiliary benefit of the SPACE model has been that it has directly facilitated coordination and learning between experts across the humanitarian-development nexus.

SPACE experts indicated that working in mixed teams, as well as regular technical team catch ups, had enabled them to engage meaningfully with and learn from experts with different specialisms, better understand different perspectives and build knowledge on specific substantive areas (e.g., determining transfer values) or cross-cutting areas (e.g. disability inclusion). However, it is unclear whether learning amongst the delivery team has translated into improved coordination between initiatives. (*'New or strengthened relationships and strategic partnerships across the humanitarian, climate resilience and SP sectors'*.)

1.5.7 Enablers and constraints

SPACE's contributions are indirect and, alone, insufficient to bring about outcome and impact level change. Factors which have enabled or constrained the achievement of results include:

Demand side

- **Clarity of user requests:** The SPACE delivery team emphasised that receiving a clear steer from in-country clients was essential (examples cited of countries from which SPACE received a strong steer included Afghanistan. Initial scoping calls generally supported the development of a clear ask. However, in cases where a clearly defined request was not received despite these efforts it was challenging for SPACE to offer useful support (e.g., as was the case with a particular assignment in Somalia).
- **Sufficiency of user bandwidth for engagement:** Engaging TA support necessarily requires time to engage on the part of users. In some cases, in-country users lacked sufficient bandwidth to draw on SPACE (e.g., Syria, Iraq) or, for those which had already drawn on the service, to request further support desired (e.g. Pakistan, Yemen case study). Some in-country advisers felt that they could have made more of SPACE support had they had more time to engage with other Embassy colleagues across siloed programme portfolios (e.g., humanitarian, social development and/or climate resilience). Capacity limitations could also be substantive; in the case of Sudan, the Project Management Unit of the Family Support Programme lacked a gender lead to act as the contact point and take on recommendations from a related assignment which they had identified as a need.
- **Whether users drew strategically on SPACE in support of their objectives:** As noted in section 5.2 above, social development advisers in Jordan drew effectively on a continuum of support from BASIC TAS and SPACE. SPACE could also be drawn on effectively in conjunction with other sources of support, as in Pakistan where GIZ requested support to build on a previous piece of work which they had procured independently. Or as an independent broker, as in DRC where SPACE hosted stakeholder workshops convened by UNICEF and WFP to influence and build consensus around the design World Bank-funded cash transfer programme.
- **ODA reprioritisation process (and other changes in user priorities):** From phase 2, the reprioritisation of ODA spending resulted in a prolonged period of uncertainty around programme budgets for country offices, resulting in several planned SPACE assignments being put on hold (e.g. design support to a new climate resilience programme in Pakistan) or, eventually, cancelled altogether. Budget cuts also curtailed uptake of the outputs of some assignments which had already been undertaken (e.g. in Liberia and Zimbabwe). Broader changes in user priorities also affected use of the SPACE service and uptake of its recommendations: in Sudan, these resulted in a pending request from the World Bank on improving their focus on GESI not being taken forward, as well as specific design aspects (recommended by SPACE) for a new FCDO programme not being taken forward.
- **Political economy of social assistance provision:** SPACE has responded to dramatically increased appetite for social protection policy and programming as a tool for responding to crises in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Several KIs indicated that demand is likely to continue, with

increasing focus in future on climate-related displacement. At the same time, important political barriers remain – for example, to integrating humanitarian caseloads into national systems where countries are hosting large refugee populations, or to developing sustainable international financing mechanisms.

Supply side

- **(Perceived) quality of expertise provided:** This has encouraged uptake of options and recommendations.
- **Length and depth of engagement:** Where SPACE has undertaken multi-stage engagements – most often characterised by an initial short engagement to explore options and entry points, followed by a medium-term, ‘deeper dive’ to explore a specific issue in detail – this has produced particularly useful and actionable advice. Examples cited included the Sahel and DRC. The length of engagement also affected the extent to which SPACE experts were able to take the bigger picture into account in shaping assignments, and not only provide relatively narrow advice on specific technical issues.
- **Level of engagement with FCDO in-country (where the direct beneficiary is not FCDO):** As noted in section 3, the SPACE operating model did not lend itself well to direct engagement with country governments, unless situated within a broader programmes of support from country offices or partners. Some FCDO staff reported that they had facilitated introductions and support to government counterparts, but that in the absence of continued communications with SPACE, they were unable to gauge whether support had furthered the FCDO’s strategic objectives, suggesting that opportunities to support FCDO’s influencing aims have been missed.

Endnotes

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- 2 Key informant interviews.
- 3 Hanna Röth, Zina Nimeh and Jessica Hagen-Zanker (2017) A mapping of social protection and humanitarian assistance programmes in Jordan: What support are refugees eligible for? London: Overseas Development Institute.
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